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Abstract 
Within the EU and across the Atlantic, investigation and prosecution of crime increasingly relies on the 
possibility to access, collect and transfer electronic information and personal data held by private 
companies across borders. Cross-border access to and collection of data for the purpose of fighting crime 
raise several legal and jurisdictional issues. This paper comparatively examines the constitutional, legal and 
administrative frameworks on access to and use of digital information in cross-border criminal justice 
cooperation in a selection of EU member states. It presents key challenges in the application of the EU 
mutual recognition and mutual legal assistance instruments, as well as the existence of 'promising practices' 
across the EU and in transatlantic relations. The paper also assesses a set of legal and practical questions 
raised by the ongoing policy and normative debate on the so-called “E-Evidence” Package. Finally, it sets 
out a number of policy options and practical ways forward for EU and national policy makers to promote 
judicial cooperation for cross-border access to and collection of electronic data in line with EU and 
international rule law and fundamental rights standards. 
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 Introduction 
While working towards the establishment of an Area of Freedom, security and justice (AFSJ), the 
European Union (EU) has progressively developed a common criminal justice area that addresses 
different aspects of intra-EU and international cross-border judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters. These include investigative measures aimed at gathering evidence abroad for the purpose 
of investigating criminal activities. 
The set of EU tools for criminal justice cooperation in the area of evidence gathering currently 
encompass the so-called 'European Investigation Order' (EIO) Directive 2014/41/EU, and Mutual 
Legal Assistance Treaties (MLAT) with countries like the United States (US). Both the EIO and the 
EU MLATs provide common supranational rules that also allows access to electronic data and the 
gathering of electronic information as evidence in criminal matters, in line with the fundamental 
rights and rule-of-law standards that govern the EU and member states’ internal and external 
action. 
Within the 'European Criminal Area', mutual recognition of judicial decisions - including those 
related to cross-border access to and gathering of electronic data in the context of criminal 
proceedings - relies upon the principle of mutual trust. The latter embodies a presumption that all 
EU Member States, and their respective judicial authorities, comply, uphold and safeguard the core 
EU constitutional principles laid down in Article 2 TEU, including the rule of law. 
The principle of mutual recognition has been developed under the premise that EU member states 
cannot refuse the execution of EU criminal justice decisions on the basis of fundamental rights 
obligations enshrined in their national constitutions. The Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) has however also clarified that 'trust must be earned' (Mitsilegas, 2019). Mutual trust in the 
EU legal system cannot be considered as blind trust (Lenaerts, 2017). This certainly has been the 
message sent by constitutional courts in different EU countries such as Germany and Spain. 
The CJEU has gradually revisited the 'automaticity' of mutual trust in EU criminal law. Member 
states judicial authorities have the duty to halt criminal justice cooperation under mutual 
recognition proceedings if there are reasons to believe that the execution of another EU country’s 
decision would expose the individual concerned to a real risk of fundamental rights abuses.1 In 
such cases, which represent exceptions to the principle of mutual trust, the executing member 
states' authorities are required to conduct an individualised assessment of the fundamental rights 
implications stemming from the enforcement of EU criminal justice decisions. Such fundamental 
rights considerations extend beyond non-derogable or absolute fundamental rights such as human 
dignity and the prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment enshrined in Article 
4 of the EU Charter. 
 
1 See Case C-216/18 PPU Minister for Justice and Equality v LM (Deficiencies in the system of justice), Judgment of 25 
July 2018. 
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The rights to an effective remedy and to fair trial (Article 47 of the EU Charter) have also been 
granted a cardinal importance in upholding the rule of law and the principle of effective legal 
protection enshrined in Article 19 TEU. The Luxembourg Court has found that effective judicial 
oversight constitutes the very essence of the rule of law, and concluded that its delivery crucially 
relies on independent courts of the EU member states. The importance to protect the rule of law 
by ensuring independence of the judiciary has been reinstated by all European institutions. This 
objective is now reflected in the EU inter-institutional policy setting and agenda, where the 
safeguarding of EU values included in Article 2 TEU stands as a key priority. 
Independent judicial authorities play a key role in securing the rule of law, and their involvement 
is crucial to maintain trust and ensure the legitimacy of the European Criminal Justice Area, and of 
any instrument or agreement adopted in the name of fighting crime. Trust cannot be taken for 
granted, and enduring trust is a daily practice in the context of judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters. This also applies to measures, rules and practices directed at enabling access to electronic 
information in criminal investigations, which have profound impacts on the rights to fair trial as 
well as on the rights of individuals as data subjects. 
An ever-close nexus exists between effective remedies, fair trial and the rights to privacy and data 
protection, as respectively enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of the EU Charter. In a context where 
access to and preservation of electronic information and communications is playing an increasing 
role in criminal investigations, fair trials rights become increasingly interconnected and intimately 
dependent upon the respect of the rights of the 'data subject', as protected in the EU legal system. 
As regards access to and subsequent use by law enforcement authorities of retained data, the 
Court of Luxembourg required that prior to access by the competent national agencies, the 
conditions of access must be reviewed: 
‘by a court or by an independent administrative body whose decision seeks to limit access 
to the data and their use to what is strictly necessary for the purpose of attaining the 
objective pursued and which intervenes following a reasoned request of those authorities 
submitted within the framework of procedures of prevention, detection or criminal 
prosecutions’.2 
Thus, access for law enforcement purposes to retained data held by private companies 
imperatively requires prior review varied out by a court or by an independent administrative body. 
Another manifestation of the key role played by independent oversight bodies in transnational 
data flows has emerged in the context of transfers of air passengers’ data (PNR – Passenger Name 
Records) by airline companies to third states. In Opinion 1/15 of 26 July 2017 the Grand Chamber 
rejected the draft Agreement between the EU and Canada on the transfer of PNR data.3 In such 
 
2 Joined cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v. Ireland, 8 April 2014, para 62. 
3 Opinion 1/15 of 26 July 2017, para 201. 
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occasion, the CJEU confirmed the need to ensure, except in cases of validly established urgency, 
that the conditions of access to information for the purpose of preventing, detecting, investigating 
and prosecuting crime are reviewed by a court or by an independent administrative body, such a 
national data protection authority (Mitsilegas and Vavoula, 2018). 
Given the large volumes of personal data gathered and processed by private companies, and the 
transnational dimension of the internet, police and criminal justice policies increasingly focus on 
equipping investigating and prosecuting authorities with the possibility to access, collect and 
exchange electronic information held by private IT and telecommunication companies across 
borders. Since requests for data sought in the context of a criminal proceeding often have 
extraterritorial and cross-jurisdictional implications, strengthening judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters while preserving fundamental rights and the rule of law has become a key policy priority 
in the EU, as well as in cooperation with third countries. Well-functioning criminal justice 
cooperation instruments for cross-border evidence gathering are required to ensure that data are 
collected in ways which prevent conflicts among different legal systems and constitutional 
traditions, and ensure compliance with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (The EU Charter) and 
Article 2 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU).  
The JUD-IT project has comparatively examined the constitutional, legal and administrative 
frameworks on access to and use of digital information in cross-border criminal justice cooperation 
in a selection of EU member states. It has studied the main issues and challenges in the application 
of the EU mutual recognition and mutual legal assistance instruments as well as the existence of 
'promising practices' across the EU and in transatlantic relations. 
The priority given to access, preservation, production, collection and transfer of electronic 
information and personal data held by companies is raising a number of fundamental legal and 
practical questions to judicial and law enforcement practitioners, defence lawyers and the private 
sector both in the EU and across the Atlantic. The project aimed at gaining a better understanding 
of the main concerns and key issues from the perspective of each of these actors. 
JUD-IT has sought to facilitate the identification of practical and policy ways forward for EU and 
national policy makers to promote judicial cooperation in criminal matters in a context of 
increasing use of electronic means and data in line with EU rule law and fundamental rights 
standards. 
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 The European Investigation Order 
KEY FINDINGS 
• Through the application of the principle of mutual recognition to evidence gathering in criminal 
matters, the EIO allows different categories of electronic information to be accessed, collected 
and exchanged through direct cooperation among judicial authorities across borders. 
• EIOs requiring collection of data allowing for the identification of persons holding a subscription 
of a specified phone number or IP address cannot lead to non-recognition or non-execution 
decisions based on the objection that such measures are not available in the state of execution. 
The executing authority might be required to execute, whenever practicable, provisional 
measures such as the preservation of data within a 24-hour deadline. 
• Verifying the legality, necessity, and proportionality of data-gathering or preservation measures 
included in EIOs is the responsibility of the issuing member state’s judicial authorities, which are 
responsible for performing the assessment against their own domestic legal standards, as well 
as in light of relevant EU primary and secondary law and the EU Charter. Issuing authorities are 
prohibited from using the EIO to collect evidence abroad that they are not able to obtain under 
their own domestic legal and constitutional procedures. 
• The executing authority needs to follow the formalities and procedures expressly indicated by 
the issuing authority, but only to the extent that these are not contrary to fundamental 
safeguards provided under their own legal system. Execution of an EIO is supposed to take place 
in the same ways and under the same modalities (and related procedural safeguards) as if the 
investigative measure concerned had been ordered by an authority of the executing State. 
 
The EU criminal justice toolbox encompasses a set of judicial cooperation instruments through 
which authorities in charge of investigating and prosecuting crime, as well as defence lawyers, can 
demand and obtain electronic information held by private companies in another jurisdiction. 
When it comes to cross-border cooperation for evidence gathering within the EU criminal justice 
area, EU mutual legal assistance mechanisms are progressively being replaced by mutual 
recognition instruments.4 The European Investigation Order (EIO) Directive5 represents a key legal 
development in the field of EU judicial cooperation. It extends the application of the principle of 
mutual recognition to the cross-border gathering of evidence (also in digital form) in criminal 
matters. While the EIO does not expressly mention 'electronic evidence' as such, the inclusion of a 
reference to 'data' in the text of the Directive indicates that different categories of electronic 
 
4 One agreement between EU countries is still in place: The Convention on mutual assistance in criminal matters. 
Council Act of 29 May 2000 establishing in accordance with Article 34 of the Treaty on European Union the Convention 
on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the member states of the European Union, [2000] OJ C 197/1. 
5 Directive 2014/41/EU regarding the European Investigation Order in criminal matters, [2014] OJ L130/1. 
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information can currently be collected and exchanged across borders through the use of this 
instrument.6 
The EIO is based on a mediated model of judicial cooperation for cross-border evidence gathering 
(Carrera, González Fuster, Guild, and Mitsilegas 2015). Such model entails direct contacts and 
communication between pre-identified public bodies of the different countries concerned by a 
cross-border proceeding. Under the EIO, the judicial authorities in the issuing member state are 
those responsible to verify the legality, necessity, and proportionality of a cross-border decision.7 
Such assessment must be conducted by the competent authorities of the issuing country against 
their own domestic legal standards, as well as in light of relevant EU primary and secondary law 
and the EU Charter. 
Member states authorities receiving an EIO will have a maximum period of 30 days to decide to 
recognise and execute the request, and 90 days to execute the request effectively. The Directive 
allows for a shorter deadline when required by the seriousness of the offence or in other 
particularly urgent circumstances. The executing authority might for instance be required to 
execute, whenever practicable, provisional measures such as the preservation of data within a 24-
hour deadline.8 A double criminality check is maintained. This is so only for orders related to facts 
falling outside the list of the 32 offences for which double criminality has been abolished. These 
are offences which are not punishable in the issuing member state by a custodial sentence or a 
detention order for a maximum period of at least three years.9 Such provisions ensure that double 
criminality grounds might only be raised by the competent authorities of the state of execution for 
certain categories of less serious offences. On the other hand, investigative measures requiring 
data allowing for the identification of persons holding a subscription of a specified phone number 
or IP are always available under the EIO, and cannot be refused in the country where the order is 
addressed based on the objection that such measures are not available in that legal system.10 
The EIO system requires member states to cooperate in the field of cross-border evidence 
gathering based on minimum formality and speed, while at the same time imposing compliance 
with a set of key safeguards. Besides demanding participating EU countries to comply with the 
principle of mutual recognition of judicial decisions in criminal matters, the EIO includes a number 
of provisions directed at ensuring respect of the constitutional and criminal justice traditions of 
different member states, as well as EU fundamental rights and the rule of law standards. 
 
6 See Art. 13 of the EIO Directive. Recital 11 of the Directive also indicates that investigative measures under an EIO 
might cover the "collection of traffic and location data associated with telecommunications, allowing competent 
authorities to issue an EIO for the purpose of obtaining less intrusive data on telecommunications". 
7 Art. 6(1)(a) of the EIO Directive. 
8 Art. 32(2) of t the EIO Directive. 
9 Art. 11(1)(g) of the EIO Directive. 
10 Art 10 (2) (e) and Art 11 (2) EIO. 
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The executing authorities need to follow the formalities and procedures expressly indicated by the 
issuing ones, but only to the extent that these are not contrary to fundamental principles provided 
under their own legal system.11 Execution of another EU country's EIO is supposed to take place in 
the same ways and under the same modalities (and related procedural safeguards) as if the 
investigative measure concerned had been ordered by an authority of the executing State in an 
equivalent domestic case.12 To ensure respect of such mechanism, it is thus important that issuing 
authorities specify whether an EIO is adopted during the pre-trial or trial phase of a criminal 
proceeding, because depending on the stage of the proceedings competent authority could be 
different in the executing country (e.g. EL; FR; HU; IT). Furthermore, the Directive requires the 
applicability of legal remedies equivalent to those applicable in a similar domestic case to the 
investigative measures indicated in the EIO.13 While the substantive reasons for issuing the EIO 
may be challenged only in an action brought in the issuing State, this is without prejudice to the 
guarantees of fundamental rights in the executing State.14 
An assessment to use an alternative investigative measure is also foreseen when the measure 
indicated in the EIO does not exist in the law of the executing country, or when the indicated 
measure is not available in a similar domestic case.15 The introduction of specific provisions on 
comparable measures in the EIO is justified not only in light of wide range of investigative means 
covered by the Directive, but also because of the diversities of national measures and procedures 
to obtain evidence. At the same time, this rule does not apply as far as the investigative measures 
indicated in the EIO are considered as 'non-coercive' under the law of the executing State. As a 
general rule, the EIO establishes that recognition or execution orders requiring data allowing for 
the identification of persons holding a subscription of a specified phone number or IP address 
cannot be refused based on the objection that such measures are not available in the state of 
execution. The same applies to offences which are not punishable in the issuing member state by 
a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least three years, based on 
double criminality grounds. 
By allowing the intervention of the competent authorities in both the issuing and executing 
country, the EIO ensures that every order is executed in accordance with the procedures and 
safeguards prescribed under the different legal systems concerned by the cross-border 
proceeding. On the one hand, the Directive includes provisions directed at preventing member 
states from obtaining evidence abroad that they are not able to obtain under their own domestic 
legal and constitutional procedures.16 On the other hand, the executing authority might decide not 
 
11 Art. 9(2) of the EIO Directive. 
12 Art. 9(1) of the EIO Directive. 
13 Art. 14(1) of the EIO Directive. 
14 Art. 14(2) of the EIO Directive. 
15 Art. 10(1) (a) and (b) of the EIO Directive. 
16 Art. 6(1)(b) of the EIO Directive. 
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to recognise and/or execute an EIO when it has been issued for certain categories of (less serious) 
offences for which the requirement of dual criminality has not been met, or based on an 
assessment of the fundamental consequences that would derive from the execution of the 
measure requested in the EIO. 
The EIO Directive list a number of specific non-recognition/execution grounds, which include cases 
where the execution of an EIO could lead to a breach of rules on immunity or privilege, or rules 
limiting criminal liability relating to freedom of the press, or where it could harm essential national 
security interests, or infringe the ne bis in idem principle. It is also foreseen that hat the recognition 
or execution of an EIO ‘may be refused in the executing State where there are substantial grounds 
to believe that the execution of the investigative measure indicated in the EIO would be 
incompatible with the executing State's obligations in accordance with Article 6 TEU and the 
Charter’.17  
The possibility foreseen in this piece of EU legislation to refuse an EIO based on fundamental rights 
grounds implies that judicial authorities have a duty to verify whether the execution of an EIO is 
compliant with fundamental rights standards. Competent authorities are called upon to assess 
whether specific fundamental rights grounds of legitimate refusal to recognise and execute an EIO 
exist. The wording of the Directive seems to suggest that a defect in this regard by another member 
state should be judged in individual cases (De Capitani and Peers, 2014). This non-recognition 
ground confirms that the presumption that all member states comply with fundamental rights is, 
in fact, rebuttable at all instances (Armada, 2015).18 The EIO Directive reiterates the limits to the 
mutual recognition principle in the preamble: if there are substantial grounds for believing that the 
execution of an investigative measure indicated in the EIO would result in a breach of a 
fundamental right of the person concerned, and that the executing State would disregard its 
obligations concerning the protection of fundamental rights recognised in the Charter, the 
execution of the EIO should be refused. Such way of cooperation allows avoiding conflicts of law 
and maintaining trust within the EU. 
The EIO Directive also foresees that the executing authorities' role in reviewing fundamental rights 
might extent to the conditions for issuing an Order. Article 6(3) states that where "the executing 
authority has reason to believe that the conditions referred to in paragraph 1 [the issuing of the 
EIO is necessary and proportionate,19 and the investigative measure(s) indicated in the EIO could 
have been ordered under the same conditions in a similar domestic case20] have not been met, it 
may consult the issuing authority on the importance of executing the EIO. After that consultation 
the issuing authority may decide to withdraw the EIO.” 
 
17 Art. 11(1)(f). 
18 Instruments of mutual recognition in criminal matters adopted before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty only 
included a general reference to the Charter but did not include a specific ground for refusal in this regard. 
19 Art 6(1)(a). 
20 Art. 6(1)(b). 
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 Implementing the EIO  
KEY FINDINGS 
• The EIO Directive only recently entered into force, and its timely transposition and 
implementation of the EIO represented an issue for some EU member states. More time 
is required for this instrument to fully flourish. 
• The EIO scheme ensures mutual scrutiny over data requests through the involvement of 
competent judicial authorities (i.e. judges or prosecutors) in the issuing and executing 
country. The ex-ante involvement of judicial authorities for the purpose of issuing and 
executing orders might increase judicial oversight over data-gathering measures that, in 
a purely domestic context, could be adopted directly by law enforcement authorities (e.g. 
police officials). 
• The EIO allows investigating and prosecuting authorities to cooperate between 
themselves with a significant degree of operational flexibility, also through the use of 
‘urgent procedures’. On the other hand, urgent requests for data only formally validated 
and issued by judicial authorities but substantially originating from police authorities 
result in some cases in a de facto 'shift' of decision-making from the judiciary to law 
enforcement agencies. 
• When issuing EIOs, some member states lift the ex-ante court validation (from a judicial 
authority different from the one conducting the investigation) that would be necessary 
for the execution of equivalent measure in a purely domestic context. In such cases, 
EIOS are issued in a way which reduce guarantees otherwise applicable in purely 
domestic proceedings.  
• Different treatments still apply to incoming EIO, when compared to equivalent 
domestic measures. Some member states impose one level of procedure in the form 
of centralized control by a central authority of EIO received by other EU member states. 
Such additional requirement is contrary to the principle according to which EIOs should 
be executed under the same procedures as if the investigative measure concerned had 
been ordered by an authority of the executing state. Furthermore, not all member 
states treat incoming EIOs with the same priority as domestic requests, and some EU 
countries appear to be unduly postponing their execution. 
• The EIO system of cooperation is characterised by an imbalance between the powers 
of the prosecution and the defendant. The EIO Directive foresees the possibility for the 
suspected or accused person, or by a lawyer on his behalf, to request the issuing of 
EIOs in conformity with national criminal procedure. However, defence lawyers are 
often unaware of the possibility to request the issuing of EIO. In some cases, national 
law transposing the EIO does not include special provisions that an investigation order 
may be issued at the request of a suspect, accused or her/his defence counsel. The 
absence in national legislation of provisions allowing suspect or accused persons access 
to the EIO challenges the possibility to develop a positive defense, or to challenge the 
evidence of the prosecution. 
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• Due to the way in which criminal investigations are conducted by member states’ 
authorities, investigative measures requested and executed through EIOs are often 
covered by 'secrecy', and suspects are only informed of access/use or transfer of their 
electronic data once the investigation is closed, just prior to the indictment. 
• A set of practical challenges currently hamper the potentials of the EIO. These include the 
persistent lack of a streamlined approach followed by EU judicial authorities in the 
formulation and transmission of EIOs, as well as of specialised personnel and equipment 
in national administrations. With several member states still requiring EIOs to be issued 
or received in their own national language, translation also constitutes a recurrent delay 
factor. 
 
 
The timely transposition and implementation of the EIO Directive has been an issue for some EU 
member states. A key finding from our research is that it is by now too early to conclude that the 
EIO is 'ineffective', slow or burdensome in practice. To date, such conclusions can neither be drawn 
with regard to the use of the EIO for accessing and exchanging electronic information sought for 
criminal justice purposes. JUD-IT research has instead showed that the implementation of the EIO 
in several EU member states has actually allowed for the introduction and operability of more 
'flexible' procedures in comparison to previously existing instruments of judicial cooperation for 
evidence gathering in criminal matters. In countries where the EIO Directive suffered from 
transposition delays (e.g. LU), judicial actors and legal practitioners anticipate smoother 
cooperation with EU partners under EIO law, in particular thanks to the introduction of 
standardised form and tight time limits. 
Judicial practitioners consulted in the JUD-IT project have underlined how, based on their 
experience, EIOs are swiftly and efficiently processed in practice and there are no major obstacles 
or structural deficiencies pertaining to the EIO model (e.g. BU; EL; IT). The EIO was referred to as 
the 'most mature' mutual recognition instrument applying to cross-border evidence-gathering in 
criminal matters, allowing for a significant degree of operational flexibility for judicial authorities, 
including the expedience and the uniformity that it has brought (AT; BU; EL). 
The EIO allows for 'urgent procedures', as illustrated in several JUD-IT Country reports. For 
example, in Hungary, controlled deliveries or the application of covert investigations can be 
initiated by the competent director of the police or of the National Tax and Customs 
Administration, for a duration of 24 hours. The competent public prosecutor is immediately 
notified and will need to subsequently approve it. From the information provided by the European 
Judicial Network (EJN),21 and JUD-IT research, email communication is permitted in some member 
states (e.g. EL, ES, FR), under the condition that it is then followed by the formal information. 
 
21 European Judicial Network (EJN, 2019), Competent authorities, languages accepted, urgent matters and scope of 
the EIO Directive1 of the instrument in the EU Member States, https://www.einforum.eu/cp/registry- 
files/3339/Competent-authorities-languages-accepted-scope-26-August-2019.pdf. 
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English language is accepted in some member states (BU, HU, EL, NL). Some countries (e.g. LU) 
accepts EIO in multiple languages (i.e. French, German, English). 
The systematic ex-ante involvement of judicial authorities22 for the purpose of issuing and 
executing EIOs introduces a minimum level of judicial oversight over data-gathering measures that, 
in a purely domestic context, could be adopted directly by law enforcement authorities. In some 
member states (AT, DE, FR, HU) the EIO showed in fact a potential to increase the level of judicial 
scrutiny and protection over the issuing and execution of cross-border data-gathering measures. 
At the same time, the JUD-IT country reports made it possible to identify a number of gaps and 
examples of incorrect national implementation that call for close scrutiny and action. An especially 
problematic aspect in this regard concerns the issuing of the EIO by some EU countries in ways 
which lowers domestic standards on judicial checks and balances. According to the text of the EIO 
Directive, member states authorities should not use it as 'forum shopping' and obtain 'evidence' 
abroad while evading domestic checks and balances and procedures. And yet, it appears that the 
judicial validation required at the domestic level for data requests might be eluded in EIO cross-
border situations (FR; NL; LU) 
In France, for instance, prior authorisation by a judge of liberty and detention is required in cases 
when the prosecutor or the investigating judge intend to perform a search of computer system 
during the preliminary investigations, and such measure is to be performed without the consent 
of the person concerned.23 However, if the execution of such measure is requested through an EIO 
transmitted to another EU country, the French prosecutor or the investigating magistrate are not 
obliged to obtain such authorisations at the domestic level, but can simply indicate in the EIO that 
the investigative acts requested therein can only be executed by the executing State with the prior 
authorisation of a judge, and in line with the manner and timings foreseen by the French Code de 
Procedure Penal (CPP). There is however no real guarantee that such a prior authorisation by a 
judge will be effectively ensured in the country of execution. Other countries like Sweden have 
correctly implemented the EIO in this respect, by envisaging that an EIO may only be issued if the 
conditions applying to conducting the investigation during a Swedish domestic investigation or trial 
in criminal proceedings and law are actually met (SE). 
In some countries (e.g. EL) urgency of requests for data is used in practice to operate a 'shifting' of 
the decision-making power from the judiciary to law enforcement agencies. This practice is liable 
to lead to manipulation of prosecutors/judges, who are often apprised of limited aspects of the 
case and almost automatically validate data requests made by the police. This practice becomes 
 
22 These authorities might be both judges and prosecutors, depending on various factors including for instance the 
crime involved, the type of data sought, the nature of the measure to be executed through the EIO, as well as the 
stage of proceedings. 
23 Article 76 para 4 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure. 
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all the more concerning in the EIO context, considering that any data lawfully obtained based on 
urgency procedures shall be subject to be handed over pursuant to judicial cooperation duties. 
In Luxembourg, the implementation of the EIO means that one level of procedure in the form of 
centralised control of outgoing requests for entraide or orders is stripped away. While this is 
justified in light of the 'minimum formality requirement', problems arise from the fact that the 
country maintained a systematic review of incoming EIOs in the execution phase, contrary to the 
principle according to which EIOs should be executed under the same ways as if the investigative 
measure concerned had been ordered by an authority of the executing State. 
A cross-cutting finding from the JUD-IT research is that the EIO system of cooperation is 
characterised by an imbalance between the powers of the prosecution and the defendant. 
Ultimately, even if Article 1(3) EIO Directive foresees the possibility for the defendant to request 
the competent prosecutor/or court to issue an EIO, this appears to be rarely possible in the 
domestic systems analysed.  JUD-IT research has brought light to the fact that defence access to 
this mutual recognition instrument is very limited in practice. In some cases, the EIO implementing 
national law has not included any special provision that an investigation order may be issued at the 
request of a suspect, accused or her/his defence counsel (SE). While the Directive foresees that 
defence requests directed at obtaining the issuing of EIOs can be enabled through reference to 
domestic laws regulating criminal procedure, there are uneven national rules and blurred/obscure 
administrative practices regarding when and if suspects can demand such measures, or have 
access to the data gathered for purposes of criminal investigations. JUD-IT research has showed 
that even when such possibility exist, legal practitioners are often not aware of it (HU). Moreover, 
in some EU countries a large margin of discretion is left to the judicial authorities responsible for 
receiving, assessing and validating defence's request for issuing an EIO (e.g. ES; HU). 
The effectiveness of existing remedies and in particular the possibility for suspects/data subjects 
to challenge EIOs in the issuing state has been by and large considered inadequate. Very often, 
investigative measures are covered by 'secrecy' and suspects are not informed or aware of 
access/use or transfer of their electronic data. Suspects often become aware of such measures 
only after the investigation closure and just prior the indictment, with defence lawyers expressing 
complaints about late or non-notification (ES; HU; EL; SE). In some EU member states access to 
files by the suspects representatives only happens right before the court procedures (HU).  
The existence of other data-gathering instruments (e.g. Council of Europe Budapest Convention) 
that can be used in parallel to the EIO was perceived positive by some practitioners who consider 
it important to have different tools that could be combined (ES; EL; FR). However, it was also 
underlined as one possible cause of underuse of EIOs and inefficiency as well as a risk of forum 
shopping. Such risks could emerge in particular where the international cooperation tools offered 
by the Budapest Convention are used in ways which might in some cases lower down EU rule of 
law or fundamental rights protection standards otherwise applicable to cross-border cooperation 
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under the EIO.24 Other practical issues may relate to the choice of proper instrument investigative 
instrument and procedure, identification of relevant contact points, as well as the 
correlation/equivalence of legal terms and notions across EU member states (ES; BU). 
JUD-IT research has showed how direct (formal and informal) contacts and interactions with their 
colleagues across borders and throughout different phases of EIO procedures constitute an 
important part of their daily work. Such practices of cross-border 'judicial dialogues' currently 
allows competent judicial authorities in member states to exchange evidence requested through 
standardised forms across borders, and through trusted channels and means of communications. 
They also allow executing authorities to require the issuing ones to provide any additional 
information, adjustments and/or rectifications that might be necessary in order to lawfully execute 
the requested data-disclosure measure. 
An example provided in this respect is represented by a case where prosecuting authorities from 
two EU countries (reportedly BU, and AT) have asked their counterparts in another member state 
(i.e. Italy) to take the lead in the investigation of a specific fact that (under the national law of the 
requesting member state) did not meet the serious crime threshold (5 years) required to 
proceed.25 In all the examples mentioned above, cooperation was made possible through contacts 
and cooperation among judicial authorities of the different member states concerned. 
Prosecutors, judges and defence lawyers who were consulted and interviewed during the project 
agreed that while the EIOs has already shown its potentials as judicial cooperation instruments for 
cross-border evidence-gathering, more time and efforts are needed in order to allow it to 'flourish' 
fully. It was for instance mentioned that not all member states treat incoming EIOs with the same 
priority as domestic requests, and that some EU countries appear to be unduly postponing their 
execution. 
The current absence of a streamlined and uniform approach to be followed by EU judicial 
authorities in the formulation and transmission of EIOs has been also identified as an obstacle, as 
well as the lack of specialised personnel and equipment in national administrations of justice (EL). 
Translation seems to be a recurrent issue highlighted by judicial authorities whose experiences in 
dealing with this instrument have been gathered through JUD-IT qualitative research (BU; EL; IT). 
 
24 See for instance the possibility offered by Art. 32.b of the Council of Europe Budapest Convention, according to 
which a part may ‘without consent of the another Party, access of receive, through a computer system in its territory, 
stored computer data located in another Party, if the Party obtains the lawful and voluntary consent of the person 
who has the lawful authority to disclose the data to the Party though that computer system’.  
25 In countries such as Bulgaria, metadata (and in particular traffic data) is only accessible for serious crime (that is, 
crime as capable of attracting a custodial sentence of more than 5 years). Requests for data sought for the prosecution 
of non-serious crime would thus be considered unlawful according to the law of that country. For instance, it was 
observed that 'computer crime' is not considered 'serious crime' according to Bulgarian law. This category of crime 
does not meet the 5 years custodial sentencing threshold which allow prosecuting authorities to lawfully access certain 
categories of data, including metadata. 
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Some member states have adopted a strategy to tackle such practical issues. A 'promising practice' 
was found in Bulgaria, where every District Prosecution Office awards a contract (following a public 
tender) to a private translation firm, which releases the Office from this burden, accelerates the 
process and ensures proper legal translation. Bulgaria also accepts EIO requests in English. 
The positive role and contributions ensured by the European Judicial Network (EJN) and Eurojust 
(in particular  by financially and practically supporting Joint Investigation Teams, JITs, in cases 
where they are consulted) have been highlighted as clear examples of facilitating efficient 
cooperation by providing contact points and information and communication platforms, liaising 
with relevant authorities, and providing training activities and materials (e.g. SE). Initiatives that 
practitioners consulted and interviewed during JUD-IT research described as particularly promising 
in order to resolve practical issues related to EIOs formulation and transmission consist of the 
creation of an electronic (and user-friendly) version of the EIO, and the establishment of a platform 
for the secure exchange of evidence in digital form (using the electronic evidence digital exchange 
platform as a tool for the secure transmission of data) that can guarantee the validity, integrity and 
authenticity of the requests, but also speed up the process through which competent authorities 
reply and transfer electronic information.26 
  
 
26 The e-CODEX (e-Justice Communication via Online Data Exchange) is a project co-funded by the EU and developed 
by a large consortium including 22 Ministries of Justice or their representatives as a part of the European e-Justice 
Digital Service Infrastructure. 
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 Member state laws and practices on access to electronic information 
KEY FINDINGS 
• National legislation related to investigative measures directed at preserving, accessing 
and collecting electronic information held by private companies and sought during 
criminal proceedings varies significantly from member state to member state. 
• The authorities responsible for requesting, validating, and executing investigative 
measures targeting electronic information differ depending on factors such as the 
specific type of data sought, whether the measure involves preservation or production 
of data, but also based on the categories of persons affected, as well as the specific stage 
of the proceeding in which such measures are to be executed. 
• Ex ante independent judicial oversight and validation of domestic and/or foreign requests 
for different categories of data sought for criminal justice purposes is often required by 
member states' legislation aimed at preventing unauthorised intrusions of fundamental 
rights and/or sovereign interests protected at the constitutional level. In some EU 
countries, for instance Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg and 
Spain, ex-ante validation by a court is under certain circumstances required in order to 
lawfully obtain the preservation or production of subscriber and/or access data. 
• A constant feature is that access to data (including non-content) sought by investigating and 
prosecuting authorities in the context of a cross-border criminal proceeding can only be 
authorised by a domestic judicial authority of the country where the measure has to be 
executed. Under national legislation, providers of IT and telecommunication services are 
not allowed to respond to direct requests for data issued by foreign investigating and 
prosecuting authorities. 
 
 
While across the EU access to data for criminal justice purposes is considered a fundamental right 
sensitive measure, the substantive rules and procedural safeguards applying to investigating and 
prosecuting authorities' requests for electronic information vary from one member state to 
another (Sieber and von Zur Mühlen, 2016). 
The grounds and circumstances justifying the issuing and execution of cross-border requests for 
access to data largely depends on member states' criminal law provisions and practices. For 
instance, in certain EU countries covered by the JUD-IT research (ES), access to data including non-
content data (e.g. IMSEI and IMEI codes) has until recently been limited to the investigation and 
prosecution of 'serious crime'. In some other member states, the seriousness of crime determines 
the authority responsible for validating a request for data sought for criminal justice purposes. In 
France, for instance, the involvement of an independent judicial authority is required for certain 
categories of serious crime, regardless of the type of data sought by the investigative measure. At 
the same time, the concept of serious crime assumes different meanings in specific national legal 
systems, and currently it still lacks a definition under EU law. Among the EU member states covered 
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by the JUD-IT research, only some have specific legislation on the admissibility of data as evidence 
in criminal proceedings (e.g. HU). Other member states do not count on such a legal framework 
being in place, and just make use of general legislation dealing with "documents” (e.g. ES; IT; LU) 
or "physical evidence” (DE). 
National legislation also outlines the procedural rules and identifies the oversight mechanisms that 
apply to the issuing and execution of both, domestic and cross-border requests for data sought for 
the purpose of preventing, detecting, investigating and prosecuting crime. The authorities 
responsible for requesting, validating, and executing investigative measures targeting electronic 
information differ depending on factors including not only the crime being investigated or 
prosecuted, but also the specific type of data sought, whether the measure involves preservation 
or production of data, but also based on the categories of persons affected, as well as the specific 
stage of the proceeding in which such measures are to be executed. 
Ex-ante independent judicial oversight and validation of domestic and/or foreign requests for data 
sought for criminal justice purposes is often required by member states' legislation aimed at 
preventing unauthorised intrusions of fundamental rights and/or sovereign interests protected at 
the constitutional level.27 In countries belonging to the continental prosecutorial system, the 
investigative judge plays a crucial role, including that of 'validation', during the trial phase (EL; HU; 
BU). The JUD-IT country reports also show that in some of the EU member states examined the 
involvement or validation by an independent judge takes place, regardless of the stage of the 
proceeding, when there are fundamental rights considerations involved in the request for 
electronic information (e.g. ES; HU). However, a key challenge identified is that a rigorous scrutiny 
by independent judicial authorities may be difficult to ensure in practice (FR; EL). 
In some member states, validation by an investigative judge or a court during specific phases of 
the pre-trial or trial criminal procedures is required for different categories of non-content data, 
including in some cases access data and subscriber information (ES). In other countries, an ex-ante 
validation by a judge is required when requests are to be executed without the consent of the 
person concerned and regard the preservation of data sought during search and seizure operations 
for 'délits flagrants' or in preliminary investigations (FR), or depending on the degree of coercion, 
i.e. investigative measures requiring coercive measures (LU; ES). Different countries require judicial 
validation or a prior court order for coercive measures entailing access to and seizure of stored 
communications (DE; ES; SE). In some of the member states studied (LU), a lack of agreement 
emerged between stakeholders involved as to whether the kind of data sought (e.g. content or 
non-content data) is relevant and have consequences for the type of fundamental rights 
protections and safeguards accorded. 
 
27 Judgment of the Court (Fourth Section) of 24 April 2018, Case of Benedik v. Slovenia, App. No. 62357/14. 
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The criteria used to determine the authorities competent to assert criminal jurisdiction also vary 
significantly across the countries covered by the JUD-IT research, with some member state looking 
at the place where services are offered (BE; ES), the place where provider/company is established 
(BU; SE), or where the criminal offence has occurred (LU). A key issue highlighted with regard to 
'cloud service providers' relates to the fact that thy use servers all over the world, which makes it 
difficult to locate where the data requested actually is, or where the measure has to be executed 
(SE). In several EU countries (e.g. BU; HU; ES), national authorities are in some cases and under 
certain conditions allowed to order disclosure of data regardless of where the latter is stored. 
While legally adopted under the law of the issuing country, such measures often have cross-
jurisdictional implications, and might result in conflicts with another country's law. 
A constant feature that emerges from the JUD-IT research at the national level is that access to 
data (including non-content) sought by investigating and prosecuting authorities in the context of 
a cross-border criminal proceeding can only be authorised by a domestic judicial authority of the 
country where such a measure has to be executed. Under member state's national legislation 
providers of IT and telecommunication services are not allowed to respond to direct requests for 
data issued by foreign investigating and prosecuting authorities. 
When it comes to cross-border requests for data issued by EU investigating and prosecuting 
authorities and addressed directly to private companies, cooperation remain, to date, largely 
"voluntary”. Voluntary means that "there is a domestic legal measure which cannot be enforced 
directly in the recipient country. Nevertheless, the distinction between voluntary and mandatory 
cooperation is not always easy to establish, and in fact, in the absence of a clear legal framework 
the parties involved may disagree on the voluntary or mandatory nature of the direct 
cooperation”.28 
Through the involvement of competent judicial authorities in the state of execution, the EIO 
Directive allows for data gathering measuring measures issued in another EU country to be 
domesticated and legally enforced. As outlined in Section 2 of this Report, the rules and procedures 
for judicial cooperation incorporated in the EIO already allow electronic data collected as part of a 
cross-border criminal investigation, and during the pre-trial of a proceeding, effectively qualify as 
evidence accepted as 'admissible' before a court of law. 
This is particularly important in a context where rules on admissibility of evidence in criminal 
proceedings vary across the Union. While it appears that in some EU countries (e.g. BE) data 
collected according to the wrong procedure or unlawfully in the pre-trial phase could still be 
 
28 European Commission (2018), "Impact Assessment accompanying the document Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on European Production and Preservation Orders for electronic evidence in 
criminal matters and Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down harmonised 
rules on the appointment of legal representatives for the purpose of gathering evidence in criminal proceedings", 
SWD/2018/118 final - 2018/0108 (COD), 17 April, p. 26, footnote 37. 
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admitted as 'evidence' depending on the judge's discretion, this is not the case in others. Some 
member states (e.g. BU; DE; ES; FR) have stricter exclusionary rules according to which the 
evidence that has been, either directly or indirectly, collected in infringement of fundamental 
rights and without the required ex ante judicial authorisation would be declared inadmissible by 
the Court. 
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Table 1. EIO and requests for data - Comparative Table 
MS Issuing and/or 
executing EIO 
imposes judicial 
validation not 
required in 
domestic 
context29  
Implementation 
practices leading 
to potential 
breach of EIO 
principles and 
rules30 
Prosecutors can 
issue requests 
during pre-trial 
phases (no prior 
validation by a 
court) 
Prior court 
validation required 
for accessing 
content data 
under national law 
Prior court 
validation required 
for non-content 
data (incl. 
subscriber and 
access) under 
national law 
Prior court 
validation 
expressly 
required for 
preservation 
of data under 
national law 
Access to data 
only for 
prosecution/ 
investigation 
of serious 
crime 
Central 
authorities 
involved in the 
EIO process 
Defence faces 
challenges in 
participating 
in EIO process 
 
Data 
inadmissible 
as evidence if 
collected in 
violation of FR 
Constitutional 
issues31 
AT ✓  (✓)      ✓ n.a.  
BE   (✓) (✓) (✓)    n.a. (✓)  
BU    ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ (✓) n.a.   
DE (✓)  ✓ (✓) (✓)  ✓  ✓ (✓) ✓ 
FR ✓ (✓) (✓) (✓) (✓) (✓)  (✓) n.a. (✓)  
EL  (✓) ✓ (✓) (✓) (✓)   (✓) ✓  
ES  (✓) (✓) ✓ (✓)  ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ 
HU ✓ ✓       ✓ n.a.  
IT (✓) ✓ ✓ (✓)      ✓ ✓ (✓) 
LU  (✓) (✓) (✓) (✓) (✓) n.a.  (✓) n.a.  
NL   ✓ ✓    ✓ ✓   
SE   ✓ (✓) (✓) (✓) n.a. (✓) ✓  ✓ 
У: Yes  (У): Yes, depending on specific circumstances   n.a.: Information not available     
Source: JUD-IT Country Reports.  
 
29 Including from prosecutors, whereas in domestic cases requests can be made directly by the police. Also includes cases where domestic measure may be issued 
by a prosecutor, but EIO needs to be validated by a judge/court. 
30 EIO implementation lead to lowering of procedural safeguards provided under national law for issuing request for data, against EIO provision. 
31 National authorities and/or constitutional courts raised doubts as to the constitutionality of implementing mutual recognition instruments when this undermines 
or runs counter constitutional safeguard provided at the national level. 
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 The EU-US Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty  
KEY FINDINGS 
• JUD-IT research has not confirmed that MLATs are by design ineffective tools for 
handling cross-border access to data. The JUD-IT research has instead shown that the 
current lack of resources and specialized personnel, both from the EU and US side 
represent a critical factor behind the length of time required for evidence gathering in 
the scope of EU-US MLAT. EU judicial authorities suffer from an insufficient 
understanding of US rules (probable cause) applying to access to data for criminal 
justice purposes. Only a few member states have appointed specialised liaison 
magistrates in the US. 
• Recent initiatives such as the "MLAT Reform” program show that significant 
improvements to practical cooperation under MLAT procedures are possible. The 
Office for International Affairs at the DoJ is understaffed, underfinance, uses a 1998 
case management software, there is currently no online platform for incoming requests 
from foreign governments. The US also lacks specialised judicial bodies working 
especially on foreign request. Initiatives such as the "MLAT Reform" program (through 
which the US Department of Justice managed to reduce the amount of pending cases 
by a third) show that significant improvements to practical cooperation under MLAT 
procedures are possible. More financial and human resources and support would be 
needed to ensure efficient MLATs implementation. 
• By subjecting cross-border requests for data to mutual and systematic judicial scrutiny, 
the EU-US Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) Agreement gives the competent judicial 
authorities of each of the parties concerned the possibility to effectively review the data-
gathering measure issued by the other one. From an EU law perspective, several questions 
arise regarding the CLOUD Act’s fitness to provide a sound legal basis for the gathering 
and transfer of data in the context of cross-border criminal proceedings. Outside the 
scope of the EU-US MLAT, the GDPR restricts the transfers and disclosures of EU data to 
a set of pre-defined exceptional circumstances. 
 
 
As far as cross-border demands for electronic information involving EU member states which are 
not part to the EIO Directive (i.e. Ireland or Denmark), or third countries (e.g. the US or Japan), EU 
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) provide channels for requesting, gathering and 
exchanging data for criminal justice purposes.  
The exact ways in which MLA requests are issued and processed largely depends on the specific 
MLA instrument used to enact cooperation, as well as on the constitutional tradition and relevant 
legal and institutional framework of the countries concerned (Galli, 2018). Despite the differences 
in national systems and procedures applying to MLA requests, two constant features traditionally 
characterise the process: first, the receipt and assessment of the request for access by the 
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designated authority of the requested state in charge of examining the MLA request against 
existing domestic and supranational legal requirements and standards; and second, the 
involvement of judicial authorities which are respectively competent, under national law, for 
validating and executing the requests for data. During the second step, the designated authority 
transmits the request to the prosecutor's office to obtain a court order. In the scope of MLATs, EU 
member states' political bodies (e.g. Ministries of Justice acting as central authorities) and judicial 
actors (including, depending on the country, courts and prosecutors) are involved in supervising 
and examining cross-border requests, although there are some MLA conventions that allow for 
direct cooperation between judicial authorities. 
As for transatlantic cooperation, the EU–US MLA Agreement32 complements existing bilateral 
treaties with particular member states and amends some of their provisions, if they provide for 
less effective avenues of cooperation between EU member states and the US.33 For member states 
that do not yet have an agreement with the US, the EU–US MLA Agreement may provide a suitable 
legal basis for cooperation.  
A consistent feature of EU-US cooperation in the field of evidence gathering under the existing 
MLA framework is the mediation by the competent national authorities required to ensure that 
the cross-border request for access to electronic information is in line with the legal and procedural 
requirements of both the issuing and requested country (Carrera at al., 2015. pp. 7-8). The 
involvement of independent judicial scrutiny in the country where an MLA request is addressed 
guarantees that each request for data is carefully assessed. EU law enforcement requests for 
access to data stored in the US are assessed against the so-called probable cause standard, as 
enshrined in the Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution. In turn, member states judicial 
scrutiny over US requests for data channeled through transatlantic MLA agreements is designed 
to ensure that the rights of suspects and accused person, as well as those of concerned third parties 
and data subjects are duly protected in line with EU and national criminal justice and data 
protection standards. 
JUD-IT research has not confirmed that MLATs are by design ineffective tools when handling 
international cross-border requests for data in a transatlantic context. The JUD-IT research has 
instead shown that the current lack of technical resources and specialized personnel, both from 
the EU and US side, represent a critical factor behind the length of time required for evidence 
gathering in the scope of EU-US MLAT. Expert discussions held throughout the JUD-IT project 
revealed that the Office of International Affairs (OIA) at the US Department of Justice (DoJ) is 
understaffed (lacking specialised judicial bodies working especially on foreign requests), and 
 
32 Council Decision 2009/820/CFSP of 23 October 2009 on the conclusion on behalf of the European Union of the 
Agreement on extradition between the European Union and the United States of America and the Agreement on 
mutual legal assistance between the European Union and the United States of America. 
33 See Article 3(2)(a) of the EU–US MLA Agreement. 
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underfinanced. The DoJ can furthermore only count on outdated information processing tools. It 
was mentioned that the OIA still uses a 1998 case-management software and lacks an online 
platform for incoming requests from foreign governments. 
Such findings confirm previous analysis which already suggested the US Congress to adopt 
legislation allowing the Department of Justice to create an online submission process for MLAT 
requests on the DOJ’s website, improving how these requests are submitted and tracked (McQuinn 
and Castro, 2017).34 Additionally, there is no publicly available guidance nor exhaustive 
information on the OIA's website on how to submit a successful MLA request, and on how to 
comply with the probable cause standard.  
Insufficient judicial training on the EU side has been referred to as a major obstacle towards 
ensuring that requests originating from member states’ judicial authorities take due account of US 
legal standards, and most notably that regarding the probable cause. Other identified issues 
include the correct application of dual criminality, in particular regarding the US constitutional right 
of freedom of expression (ES; HU); and difficulties in proving or substantiating 'urgency', e.g. the 
existence of a clear and imminent threat against specific people (ES). Further causes of delays 
identified by practitioners and regarding requests issued by EU authorities include 
misunderstandings regarding the procedures, and translation issues (IE); as well as the lack of 
knowledge of the exact location of the electronic data (ES; SE). As far as data requests originating 
from the US are concerned, practical and legal obstacles on MLATs implementation reportedly 
include a lack of clarity in the ways in which the requests are formulated (ES). 
Practitioners interviewed and consulted during the JUD-IT research and activities in the EU and the 
US highlighted that more financial and human resources and support would be needed to increase 
efficiency in MLATs implementation. They suggested an online network with all relevant 
information and allowing for submission of requests 24 hours a day and seven days a week, 
including information on follow up procedures and expected timetable (e.g. BU). Others 
highlighted that an official chart/explanation of the various stages comprising the investigation in 
different member states and the legal protections/safeguards applicable in each of them would be 
of great assistance (IE). Recent EU initiatives directed at increasing funding towards training for 
practitioners, including most notably on probable cause requirements, appears particularly 
valuable tool to improve criminal justice cooperation in the field of data-gathering at the 
transatlantic level.  
On the US side, initiatives such as the "MLAT Reform” program undertaken by the US Department 
of Justice (DoJ) reportedly allowed to reduce the OIA caseload backlog by a third, ‘from an all-time 
high in 2016 of 13,421 to less than 9,038’ in 2019. Such results were obtained through the 
 
34 These scholars also recommended Congress to allow the DOJ to create an online docketing system for all MLAT 
requests that could allow foreign governments to track the status of their requests, improving the overall transparency 
of the system. 
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disbursement of 13 million dollars and the opening of 72 positions (37 attorneys and 35 paralegals) 
at the DoJ Office of International Affairs (OIA).35  While not exclusively limited to incoming requests, 
and not exclusively tackling issues related to the gathering of electronic data, the MLATs reform 
shows that significant improvements to practical cooperation under MLAT procedures are 
possible, provided that adequate financial and human resources are deployed. Such resources 
could be used by the OIA to support prosecutors and law enforcement in the US and abroad in 
navigating domestic and foreign laws, treaties, and other requirements. The DoJ also recognised 
that ‘to continue the progress made, permanent funds are needed to cover these critical positions 
and to allow the US government to sustain a ‘timely and efficient international framework for 
allowing foreign governments to request access to data stored within the United States’.36 
Other solutions currently explored to improve cooperation between member states and US judicial 
and diplomatic authorities include the organization of technical dialogues, training, and exchange 
of information and best practices on applicable rules and procedures related to the issuing and 
treatment of MLA requests in a transatlantic context. Simplifying procedures could also help 
reducing processing times of incoming data requests issued by EU authorities and executed by the 
US through existing MLA channels. It has been noted that currently, “DOJ reviews all data it 
receives from companies pursuant to an MLAT request before forwarding that data to the 
requesting government. However, because both DOJ and the U.S. Attorney’s office have already 
cleared this request before serving it on the company, this step is unnecessary” (Mcquinn and 
Castro, 2017).  
Outside MLA channels, EU investigating authorities may address requests for certain categories of 
electronic information, and most notably non-content data, directly to US service providers. To 
date, this form of direct cooperation with US service providers remains however largely voluntary 
in nature. US law in fact only allows, but not oblige, US service providers to disclose non-content 
data to foreign authorities. As a consequence, data disclosure requests addressed directly to 
service providers lack legal certainty, especially when compared with MLA regimes, under which 
incoming foreign requests are to be executed (as if they were domestic ones) by virtue of a 
compulsory order issued by the competent judicial authority in the country of execution. And yet, 
noting that requests to access and gather electronic information held by service providers across 
borders have become a common criminal investigative practice across the EU, the Commission 
expressed doubts that current and future volumes of data requests could be dealt with under MLA 
processes.37  
 
35 United States, Department of Justice, "FY 2019 Budget Request: Other Key Increases". 
36 Ibid, p. 1. 
37 European Commission (2018), “Impact Assessment accompanying the document Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on European Production and Preservation Orders for electronic evidence in 
criminal matters and Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down harmonised 
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Figures provided in the so-called ‘transparency reports’ produced by tech companies such as 
Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Twitter and Apple indicate a constant increase in data requests 
received by these US service providers. The European Commission’s estimated that, given the 
current market share of these companies, “up to 90% of current cross-border requests for non-
content data are sent to these five providers”.38 While indicating that these requests “mostly” 
concern non-content data, the Commission also noted how these transparency reports suffer from 
important limitations. For instance, the reports do not distinguish whether reported requests came 
directly from the member state in which they originated, or from an authority which mediated 
such request. As such, based on the information provided by the transparency reports it is difficult 
to precisely quantify the amount of requests executed based on voluntary (unmediated) disclosure 
procedures, compared to those executed through MLA cooperation mechanisms.  
A particular set of challenges emerge when data-gathering measures addressed directly to service 
providers subject to EU law originate from non-EU countries, including the US. US investigating and 
prosecuting authorities can in fact directly order US companies to produce data stored aboard, 
including when such data are in the EU, or fall under the scope of EU data protection legislation. If 
probable cause is shown, the US government can in fact obtain a warrant under the Stored 
Communication Act (SCA) requiring an Internet Service Provider to produce customer information, 
emails, and other materials, regardless of their location. The power to order disclosure of data 
stored overseas was traditionally justified on the basis of the special nature of SCA warrants, and 
the understanding that it is for the US company with control over the data to grant US authorities 
the power to compel its production (Kyriakides, 2014). 
After the authority of US federal courts to issue warrants for the search and seizure of data located 
outside the territory of the United States was challenged in the Microsoft Ireland case,39 the US 
government introduced the CLOUD Act,40 which the US legislator adopted with the intention of 
clarifying that the SCA's scope of application extends to data stored abroad. Part I of the Act41 now 
formally grants US authorities the power, under US law, to order private companies to disclose the 
"content of a wire or electronic communication and any record of other information” about a 
person, regardless of either the nationality of the latter or the location of the data. Providers can 
 
rules on the appointment of legal representatives for the purpose of gathering evidence in criminal proceedings”, 
SWD/2018/118 final – 2018/0108 (COD), 17 April 2018, p. 9. 
38 Ibid., p. 14. 
39 The dispute essentially questioned the lawfulness of extraterritorial assertion of US criminal jurisdiction in light of 
standing (i.e. pre-CLOUD Act) domestic legislation. The US Department of Justice argued that its warrant authority under 
the SCA required US-based companies to turn over the requested data, regardless of where the latter were stored. 
Microsoft, by contrast, defended that this authority did not extend to data located outside United States territory. 
40 Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD Act), S. 2383, H.R. 4943. 
41 Section 103 of the CLOUD Act. 
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also be ordered to preserve data in their possession for up to 180 days prior to the issuance of any 
compulsory process. 
From an EU law perspective, a number of questions arise with regard to the CLOUD Act's fitness to 
provide a sound legal basis for the gathering and transfer of data in the context of cross-border 
criminal proceedings. An especially controversial point seems to be whether articles 48 and 49 of 
the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) authorise, or rather impede, the disclosure and 
transfer of data requested by US law enforcement authorities according to Part I of the CLOUD Act. 
Prima facie, Article 4842 of the GDPR seems to forbid controllers or processors falling under EU 
jurisdiction to transfer or disclose personal data to third (i.e. non-EEA) countries' authorities when 
such data have been requested outside the legal channels provided by existing MLA agreements. 
In light of this provision, many companies might be reluctant to directly execute a US warrant, 
given the risk that compliance with such a measure could entail breaching EU data protection law, 
and expose them to a fine for up to €20 million or, in the case of a company, 4% of the worldwide 
annual turnover. On the other hand, some speakers and participants who took part in the JUD-IT 
Task Force noted that Article 48 of the GDPR was purposely formulated in an ambiguous way.43 On 
the one hand, the article stresses that third countries authorities' requests for transfers or 
disclosure of data "may only be recognised or enforceable” if based on an international agreement 
(i.e. an MLA). On the other hand, it also appears to contradict itself by indicating that this is 
"without prejudice to other grounds for transfer” pursuant to the same Chapter of the GDPR. In 
this regard, it was noted that a reference to "derogations” for specific situations (including 
"important reasons of public interests”) is included in the text of Article 49 of the same Regulation. 
According to some, this provision could thus allow direct cooperation between EU service 
providers and US law enforcement authorities. 
During the last meeting of the JUD-IT Task Force, one speaker noted that (although included in 
Chapter 5 of the GDPR) Article 48 per se cannot constitute a legal basis for disclosure nor transfer. 
Data can in fact well cross borders while still remaining under the scope of the GDPR. Rather than 
authorising disclosure or transfer of data, Article 48 of the GDPR seems instead to require that 
transfers and disclosures of EU data to third countries' authorities comply with the set of rules and 
standards provided under primary and secondary EU privacy and data protection law, as 
 
42 Article 48 of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) states: "any judgment of a court or tribunal and any 
decision of an administrative authority of a third country requiring a controller or processor to transfer or disclose 
personal data may only be recognised or enforceable in any manner if based on an international agreement, such as 
an MLAT, in force between the requesting third country and the Union or a Member State, without prejudice to other 
grounds for transfer pursuant to this Chapter.” 
43 Early drafts of the Regulation expressly foresee a ban on transfers to foreign regulators to disclose and transfer data 
to foreign authorities without specific prior approval of a domestic data protection authority. The provision proposed 
during the negotiation of the GDPR has however been taken out of the final text. 
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progressively interpreted by the CJEU. These EU legal requirements must be met in order for a 
service provider subject to the GDPR to lawfully execute a cross-border data request under EU law. 
The question that remains to be answered, therefore, is whether and how respect of such 
conditions can be ensured effectively in a legal and operative context such as the one established 
by Part I of the CLOUD Act.44 Safeguarding EU citizens against the risks that derive from divergences 
in the level and scope of fundamental rights protection granted respectively by the EU and the US 
legal systems has been a key point of controversy in previous transatlantic discussions on 
international data transfers, which eventually led to the adoption of the EU-US Umbrella 
Agreement.45 The main objective underlying the EU-US Umbrella Agreement is precisely to ensure 
adherence to EU data protection standards in transatlantic data transfers. These standards apply 
when personal data are exchanged for reasons relating to the prevention, investigation, detection 
and prosecution of criminal offences, and cover transfer by private companies in the territory of 
one party to the competent authority of the other party. The Umbrella Agreement grants EU 
citizens the possibility to seek judicial remedies before US courts if US authorities mishandle their 
data.46 
However, the EU-US Umbrella Agreement "in and of itself shall not be the legal basis for any 
transfers of personal information”, as it rather represents a "framework” for the protection of 
personal data that are exchanged between the US and EU member states. In transatlantic relations, 
the basis for the exchange of evidence in criminal law matters is instead provided by the EU-US 
MLA Agreement.69 The latter provides for ‘collection of evidence by consent’, and is designed to 
embody ‘a carefully negotiated balance’ between not only the interests, but also the obligations 
of different states. Outside the MLA channels, the scope that service providers subject to EU law 
have to lawfully execute US authorities request for data is limited to exceptional circumstances 
which are precisely enumerated and circumscribed in the GDPR.47 
By subjecting cross-border requests for data to mutual and systematic judicial scrutiny, the EU-US 
MLA Agreement gives the competent judicial authorities of each of the parties concerned the 
possibility to effectively review the data-gathering measure issued by the other one. The 
importance of planning for systematic and reciprocal judicial oversight over EU-US cooperation in 
 
44 Part I of the formally grants US authorities the power to order US private companies abroad to disclose the "content 
of a wire or electronic communication and any record of other information”. 
45 Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the protection of personal 
information relating to the prevention, investigation, detection, and prosecution of criminal offences, OJ L 336/3, 
10.12.2016. 
46 Agreement of 25 June 2003 on mutual legal assistance between the European Union and the United States of 
America, OJ L 181, 19.7.2003, pp. 34-42. 
47 EDPB/EDPS (2019), Initial legal assessment of the impact of the US CLOUD Act on the EU legal framework for the 
protection of personal data and the negotiations of an EU-US Agreement on cross-border access to electronic 
evidence, 10 July 2019. 
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the field of evidence gathering was highlighted by the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) 
in its Opinion on the negotiating mandate of an EU-US agreement on cross-border access to 
electronic evidence. The EDPS recommended in particular the involvement of judicial authorities 
designated by the other Party to the agreement as early as possible in the process of gathering 
electronic evidence so that these authorities would have the possibility to review the compliance 
of the orders with fundamental rights and raise grounds for refusal. 48  
The European Data Protection Board has stressed that: “In situations where there is an 
international agreement such as a mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT), EU companies should 
generally refuse direct requests and refer the requesting third country authority to an existing 
mutual legal assistance treaty or agreement".49 Jointly with the EDPS, the Board has recently 
reiterated that “where disclosure of personal data is compelled by a third-country authority, the 
MLAT process must ensure that data is disclosed in compliance with EU law, and under the 
supervision of the courts in the EU”.50 
  
 
48 EDPS (2019), Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the negotiating mandate of an EU-US 
agreement on cross-border access to electronic evidence, 2 April 2019. 
49 EDPB (2018), Guidelines 2/2018 on derogations of Article 49 under Regulation 2016/679, p. 5. 
50 EDPB/EDPS (2019), p. 3. 
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 The e-evidence proposals 
KEY FINDINGS 
• The Commission proposal for a regulation on European Production and Preservation 
Orders envisages the introduction of two new crime-fighting tools that would allow EU 
member states investigating and prosecuting authorities to compel service providers 
by sending the respective Certificates (European Production Order Certificate – EPOC 
and European Preservation Order Certificate – EPOC-PR) across borders to produce or 
preserve electronic information sought in the context of a criminal proceeding. The 
company or its legal representative would be responsible for receiving and enforcing 
the European Production and Preservation Orders. 
• Different judicial authorities would be responsible for issuing the orders depending on 
the type of measure concerned, and data sought. Prior validation by a court would be 
required for production orders concerning content and traffic data. These data could 
be requested for offences capable of attracting a custodial sentence of a maximum 
penalty of at least three years. Access and subscriber data could additionally be 
requested also by prosecutors, and for all categories of crime. European Preservation 
Orders could be issued by prosecutors, judges and courts, for all types of crime, and 
regardless of the type of data concerned. 
• The proposal intends to 'move beyond' the model of direct cooperation between 
judicial authorities currently adopted by existing EU instruments of mutual recognition 
in criminal matters. Under the proposed regulation, the authorities of the member 
state where the measure is addressed would not be systematically involved in the 
execution of other member states' orders. 
• It is proposed that the 'competent authorities' of the member state where an EPOC or 
EPOC-PR is addressed shall be consulted if the issuing state has reasons to believe that 
data requested is protected by immunities and privileges under the law of the country 
of execution, or that the disclosure may impact fundamental interests of that member 
state. Such duty to seek clarification is limited to production orders targeting content 
or transactional data. 
• The intervention of judicial authorities in the member state where an EPOC or EPOC-
PR order has to be executed might be required to enforce the investigative measure in 
the event that the private company concerned objects. The authorities of the member 
state of execution will have to enforce EPOCs or of EPOC-PRs that are not directly 
executed by the addressee of the order, unless they find that: non-compliance grounds 
as raised and identified by the addressed company are well founded; the data 
concerned is protected by an immunity or privilege under its national law, or; c) its 
disclosure may impact fundamental interests such as national security and defence. 
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• The Council of the European Union adopted its general approach on the draft 
regulation on European Production and Preservation Orders, proposing the 
establishment of a limited notification system. Notifications should only be given by the 
issuing authorities in specific circumstances, and only for orders targeting content data. 
The Council’s general approach also proposes eliminating the possibility for addressees 
of an order to raise objections if it was apparent that the Order manifestly violets the 
Charter or it was manifestly abusive and foresees the introduction of new sanctions in 
case of non-compliance. 
 
 
The European Commission proposed the introduction of a new set of rules on electronic 
information gathering for the purpose of, detecting, investigating, and prosecuting crime. These 
rules envisage conferring extraterritorial jurisdiction on member states' prosecuting and 
investigating authorities enabling them to address a private entity in another EU country directly, 
without the systematic ex ante involvement of the authorities of the member state in which the 
undertaking or its legal representative is located. 
At the EU level, discussions on the need to create a tool facilitating access to electronic data for 
cross-border criminal proceedings took on particular salience in 2015 when the Commission 
presented the European Agenda on Security.51 In April 2018, the Commission tabled two legislative 
proposals on the gathering of electronic evidence in criminal matters. 
The first is a proposal for a regulation foreseeing the introduction of two new crime-fighting tools, 
namely the European Production and Preservation Orders. The European Production Order 
consists of a mandatory request that member state investigating and prosecuting authorities could 
issue to obtain a piece of electronic information directly from a service provider, as defined in Art 
2 of the Regulation, if such provider is established in another member state or offers its services in 
the EU. The European Preservation Order would instead impose upon service providers outside 
the issuing member state the obligation to preserve stored data in view of a subsequent request 
to produce such data. The subsequent request to obtain the preserved data has been designed in 
view of allowing the member state issuing the Preservation Order to consequently secure 
production of the data sought (through a production order, or another available instruments), but 
it could originate from another member state conducting a criminal investigation or a third 
country, provided that the they are made aware of the preservation.  
The second consists of a proposal for a directive that would introduce an obligation for 
communications service providers, social networks, online marketplaces and all providers of 
internet infrastructures (e.g. internet protocol (IP) addresses and domain name registries) in the 
 
51 European Commission (2015), "Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the "Committee of the Regions: The European Agenda on Security”, 
COM(2015) 185 final, 28 April. 
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EU to appoint at least one legal representative to act as a point of contact for Production and 
Preservation Orders addressed by the issuing authority. The proposal covers service providers 
wherever their headquarters are located or the information sought is stored, as long as they offer 
their services in the Union and they are not providing their services only on the own territory of 
the issuing member state. The company or its legal representative would be responsible - on behalf 
of the company - for "receiving, complying with and enforcing” orders and decisions issued by 
member states authorities competent for the purposes of gathering evidence in criminal 
proceedings, including the European Production and Preservation Orders proposed under the new 
e-evidence regulation. 
In terms of material scope, the Commission's proposed regulation encompasses different 
categories of electronic information, covering both content data (e.g. text, voice, videos, images 
and sounds stored in a digital format) and non-content data (including subscriber data, metadata, 
access logs and transaction logs). The proposed regulation distinguishes between content data and 
transactional data on the one hand, and access data and subscriber information on the other.52 
The proposal foresees that different authorities would be responsible for issuing the orders 
depending on the type of data sought.53 Prior validation of a court would only be required for 
production orders concerning two categories of data (content and transactional) considered as 
having high "level of interference” with fundamental rights. These data could be requested for 
offences capable of resulting in a maximum custodial sentence of at least three years. Access and 
subscriber data could instead be requested not only by a judge and court, but also by a prosecutor, 
and for all categories of crime. European Preservation Orders (only ensuring preservation and not 
access to data) could be issued by a prosecutor, judge or court, for all types of crime, and regardless 
of the type of data concerned. 
The new system envisaged to obtain electronic data would still rely on the authorities in the 
member state responsible for issuing an EPOC and/or EPOC-PR to assess the legality and 
proportionality of an order. The authorities of the EU country where the addressee is located 
would, instead, not be automatically involved in the process. The proposed regulation foresees 
that before the issuing of a production order some form of consultation might be required between 
the issuing state and the member state where the service provider is addressed, but only if the 
issuing authority has reasons to believe that the data requested are protected by immunities and 
privileges granted under the law of the country of execution, or that the disclosure may impact the 
fundamental interests of that member state.54 Such a duty to seek clarification is furthermore 
limited to production orders targeting content or transactional data. 
 
52 Article 2(7)-(10) of the proposed regulation. 
53 Article 5 of the proposed regulation. 
54 Art. 5(7) of the proposed regulation. 
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Outside such circumstances, the intervention of the judicial authorities in the country of execution 
is only envisaged if the addressee of an order (the service provider or its legal representative) 
decides - based on its own assessment - to object its execution based on a set of limited non-
execution ("non-compliance”) grounds pre-identified in the proposed regulation (Stefan and 
González Fuster 2018, pp. 39-44). 
According to the Commission proposal, the role of the judicial authorities in the member state 
where the addressee of an Order is located and has to be executed is therefore only incidental, 
and mainly directed at enforcing the investigative measure in the event where the private company 
concerned objects. The enforcement of EPOCs or of an EPOC-PRs that are not directly executed by 
the addressee is in fact required upon the authorities of the country of enforcement, unless they 
find that: a) non-compliance grounds - as raised and identified by the addressed company are well 
founded; b) the data concerned is protected by an immunity or privilege under the national law of 
the enforcing state, or; c) its disclosure may impact fundamental interests such as national security 
and defence.55 
On 7 December 2018, the Council of the European Union adopted its general approach on the 
Draft Regulation on European Production and Preservation Orders.56 The major amendment 
proposed by the Council in comparison to the text elaborated by the Commission is the 
establishment of a limited notification system. The Council’s general approach foresees that 
notifications should only be given by the issuing authorities in specific circumstances, and only for 
orders targeting content data57 which are considered a priori more sensitive. 
When the issuing authority has reasonable grounds to believe the person whose data are sought 
is not residing on its own territory, the issuing authority must inform the enforcing state and give 
it an opportunity to flag whether the data requested may fall under the following categories: data 
protected by immunities and privileges; data subject to rules on determination and limitation of 
criminal liability related to freedom of expression/the press; and data whose disclosure may impact 
the fundamental interests of the state. 
The issuing authority shall take these circumstances into account as if provided for under its own 
national law,58 and it shall withdraw or adapt the order where necessary to give effect to these 
grounds. Such notification procedure was requested from several parties (Wahl, 2019). As far as 
the companies are concerned, the possibility of non-complying with an Order when it appears that 
its execution would result into a manifest violation of the EU Charter considerations has been 
 
55 Art. 14 of the proposed regulation. 
56 Council of the European Union, Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on European production 
and preservation orders for electronic evidence in criminal matters - general approach, 15020/18, Brussels, 30 
November 2018. 
57 Ibid., art 7a. 
58 Ibid. recital (35c) 
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eliminated from the Council's general approach. Furthermore, the proposal was made in the 
general approach of the Council to add a punitive sanction of 2% of turnover in case of non-
compliance. 
The Commission's proposals, as well as the general approach of the Council on the draft Regulation 
proved highly controversial among several groups of key stakeholders, as confirmed by the critical 
opinions expressed by EU bodies,59 associations of legal professional,60 industry organisatons,61 as 
well as civil society representatives.62 An extensive set of working documents produced by the 
European Parliament LIBE Secretariat and presented by the rapporteur and the co-rapporteurs 
during LIBE meetings also highlighted outstanding issues and raised doubts with regard to the 
legality, necessity and overall added value of the proposed instruments.63 
  
 
59 European Data Protection Board (EDPB), Opinion 23/2018 on Commission proposals on European Production and 
Preservation Orders for electronic evidence in criminal matters (Art. 70.1.b), adopted on 26 September 2018. 
60 ECBA Opinion on European Commission Proposals for: (1) A Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on European Production and Preservation Orders for electronic evidence & (2) a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council laying down harmonized rules on the appointment of legal representatives for the 
purpose of gathering evidence in criminal proceedings. 
61 EuroISPA's considerations on Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on European Production 
and Preservation Orders for electronic evidence in criminal matters, June 2018. 
62 Civil society urges Member States to seriously reconsider its draft position on law enforcement access to data or "e-
evidence". 
63 European Parliament, Public Register of Documents.   
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 Cross-cutting challenges 
KEY FINDINGS 
• Under EU instruments of mutual recognition in criminal matters, judicial authorities of 
different member states are reciprocally required to trust that their decisions comply with 
the principles and values set forth in Article 2 TEU. The decision to allocate trust upon the 
member states authorities representing the judicial power ('judiciary') depends on the 
fact that only independent judicial authorities possess the statutory requirements and 
institutional capacity needed to duly perform the duty to protect fundamental rights in 
the context of criminal proceedings. 
• In criminal matters, so far Article 82(1) TFEU has been used as legal basis for instruments 
of mutual recognition of decisions issued and executed by competent member states' 
judicial authorities. The duty to verify compliance with fundamental rights and the rule of 
law standards rely, in the first place, upon the authorities of the issuing member state, 
which have the responsibility of assessing the legality, necessity and proportionality of a 
cross-border measure entailing access to data sought for criminal justice-related 
purposes. On the other hand, the systematic ex-ante involvement of competent judicial 
authority in the country of execution remains crucial to verify the existence of the 
exceptional circumstances in the presence of which the principle of mutual recognition 
ceases to operate.  
• Independent judicial scrutiny in the context of mutual recognition in criminal matters 
emerges as crucial for the operation of different instruments of mutual recognition, 
including those allowing to access, collect, and exchange data for the purpose of 
investigating and prosecuting and investigating crime. These constitute practices which 
affect fundamental rights and consequently call for effective judicial protection of 
potentially affected individuals under EU law. While implementing the EIO Directive, some 
EU member states still grant or envisage (either formally or in administrative practices) 
the power to issue data-gathering measure to police services.  
• In the Commission’s proposal for a Regulation establishing European Production or 
Preservation Orders, the issuing authorities would still be responsible for carrying out the 
assessment on legality, necessity and proportionality. Differently from existing EU law 
instruments for mutual recognition of judicial decisions in criminal matters, the proposed 
regulation would however do without the systematic ex ante involvement of competent 
authorities in the EU country where an order is to be executed. And yet, recent CJEU case 
law shows that judicial oversight in both the issuing and executing state remains central 
to maintain trust in the EU criminal justice area. 
• The main qualitative difference between the EIO and the proposed Orders does not lie in 
differences between the authorities responsible for issuing or validating an order, but 
rather on the fact that the under the proposed Regulation there would not be a systematic 
involvement of the competent judicial authorities of the country of 
execution/enforcement which could secure effective remedies in cases where there is a 
lack of judicial independence, and risks of ‘prosecutorial biases’ exist in issuing countries. 
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• Fundamental rights concerns emerge from the analysis of the proposed e-evidence 
regulation. First, the proposed regulation would fail to systematically ensure effective 
judicial protection in cases where the issuing authority does not qualify as an independent 
judicial actor. Second, the assumption that production of preservation of some categories 
of data (subscriber and access) are a priori less sensitive from a fundamental rights 
perspective appears in tension with the CJEU jurisprudence and the constitutional 
traditions of several member states. Third, 'non-disclosure orders' might be issued 
without the need for the issuing authority to explicitly justify the necessity to keep the 
investigative measure secret. Such orders might potentially be issued in all criminal 
proceedings and would not necessarily be restricted to cases where notification to the 
data subject would put life, limb or property into danger. Fourth, complaint mechanisms 
and/or appeal procedures are limited in scope and only foreseen for Production Orders. 
• Legal and practical challenges emerge from the perspective of the private sector. 
Companies noted that the limited information available in the certificate would render 
difficult to assess the existence of non-compliance grounds (as foreseen in the 
Commission proposal) and object the execution of an order. Service providers also 
expressed concerns about difficulties that would derive from the obligation to execute 
orders under significant time pressure, as well as with regard to the capacity to deal with 
potentially high numbers of requests. Furthermore, concerns have been expressed about 
the possible difficulties related to the seeking of reimbursement of costs before the 
authority of the issuing member state, instead of those of the country of execution.  
 
7.1 Criminal justice challenges  
Who issues and executes data requests for criminal justice purposes within the EU?  
Mutual recognition of national judicial decisions in criminal matters has so far been only applied 
between judicial authority-to-judicial authority. Under existing EU instruments of mutual 
recognition in criminal matters, the judicial authorities in the issuing Member State are supposed 
to verify the legality, necessity and proportionality of a cross-border decision (Heard and Mansell, 
2011). A residual but still crucial role is at the same time entrusted to the judicial authorities of the 
EU country where a cross-border criminal justice measure is to be executed. The ex-ante 
involvement of the competent judicial authorities in the member state of execution is needed to 
execute the measure on their territory. The executing authorities also have a central role for 
avoiding the recognition of an issuing member state’s decision being translated into a violation of 
the rule of law or fundamental rights safeguards regarded as essential under the EU legal system 
and/or the national law of the executing country.  
The judicial authorities competent for, respectively, validating and executing a criminal justice 
measure vary in each member state. Sometimes these authorities might be both judges and 
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prosecutors, depending on various factors including for instance the crime involved, the stage of 
proceedings, and the legal instrument used as legal basis. 
Article 2 of the EIO Directive provides general definitions of who qualifies as issuing, validating and 
executing authority. Such authorities might vary according to the investigative measure requested, 
and the case concerned. The issuing authority might be a judge, a court, an investigating judge or 
a public prosecutor.64 When in accordance with national law of the issuing country the gathering 
of evidence is ordered by an authority different from a court, judge or prosecutor, the EIO shall be 
validated by one of these judicial authorities, which remain responsible for examining the Order’s 
conformity with the conditions for issuing an EIO.65 As noted by Eurojust and the European Judicial 
Network (EJN) in their Joint Note on the practical application of the EIO, the EIO Directive has 
‘judicialised’ the issuing phase by requiring EIOs to ‘be issued by a judge, a court, an investigating 
judge or a public prosecutor competent in the case concerned (judicial authority as issuing 
authority), or by requiring that an EIO be validated by one of these authorities (judicial authority 
as validating authority).’66 
As far as the recognition and execution of an EIO is concerned, Article 2(d) EIO DIR generally defines 
the executing authority as the ‘authority having the competence to recognise an EIO and ensure 
its execution’, as identified by the national law of the executing member state. While recognition 
and execution of an EIO is due to comply with formalities and procedures expressly indicated by 
the issuing authority, some important checks must still be performed by the ‘competent 
authorities’ of the county of execution. The latter are in particular due to verify that the measures 
requested in the EIO are ‘not contrary to fundamental principles of law of the executing State’. 
Executing authorities might also take active part in the EIO’s execution process also by assessing 
the opportunity to have recourse to a less intrusive investigative measure that the one indicated 
in the EIO when this would allow to achieve the same investigative/evidentiary result.67 
Furthermore, executing authorities are also called to assess the existence of one of the (limited 
and exhaustive) grounds of non-recognition provided under Article 11 of the Directive. As already 
mentioned, these grounds - which must be interpreted restrictively -  also include the refusal to 
execute an EIO upon the identification of substantial grounds to believe that the execution of the 
investigative measure included therein would be incompatible with the executing State's 
obligations in accordance with Article 6 TEU and the Charter.  
The possibility for the executing authorities to take into account their own national law when giving 
effect to EIOs, and their responsibility to examine the fundamental rights impact of received EIOs 
 
64 Art. 2 (c) (i) of the EIO Directive. 
65 Art. 2 (c) (ii) of the EIO Directive. 
66 Eurojust and European Judicial Network, ‘Joint Note of Eurojust and the European Judicial Network on the practical 
application of the European Investigation Order’, June 2019. 
67 Article 10(3) of the EIO Directive. 
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on the affected individuals call into question the possibility to perform such functions without the 
involvement of a competent judicial authority in the country of execution. 
Restricting the operationalization of mutual recognition to cooperation among judicial authorities 
is justified considering that both the principle of separation of powers and the judicialisation of EU 
criminal justice cooperation constitute crucial conditions to maintain trust within the criminal 
justice area. That notwithstanding, some EU member states investigated by the JUD-IT Project still 
formally envisage or grant in administrative practices the power to adopt or execute fundamental 
right sensitive measures such as the access to and the collection of data sought in criminal 
proceedings to police services. In some cases, decision-making powers are even shifted in actual 
practice from the judiciary to law enforcement agencies. Human rights monitoring bodies such as 
the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms while countering Terrorism, and the Council of Europe Human Rights 
Commissioner have raised concerns about the case of France, in particular regarding the negative 
rule of law implications of anti-terrorism legislation and 'state of emergency'. In particular, these 
bodies deplored the blurring in the separation of powers in the country, indicating how such policy 
and legislative process prevents the exercise of ex ante effective judicial scrutiny over law 
enforcement measures, and undermines the constitutionally entrenched distinction between 
judicial and administrative police in the country. 
The decision to allocate trust upon the member states judicial authorities depends precisely on the 
principle of separation of powers, and the fact that only the authorities representing the judicial 
power ('judiciary') possess the statutory requirements and institutional capacity needed to 
adequately perform the duty to protect fundamental rights in the context of criminal proceedings. 
Member states’ judicial authorities are in fact those upon which the duty to protect and enforce 
rights arising from EU law primarily rely.68 As Lenaerts stated, “the authors of the Treaties took the 
view that national courts were best placed to protect the fundamental rights of individuals as they 
are insulated from political [private or commercial] considerations and are, in cooperation with the 
ECJ, entrusted with the task of upholding the rule of law within the EU" (Lenaerts, 2017, p. 809). 
Two key questions that have been posed to the CJEU along the years are thus: who qualifies as a 
'judicial authority', and who is an 'Issuing Judicial Authority' possessing the level of independence 
from the executive required to maintain the high level of mutual trust required for the functioning 
of EU criminal justice cooperation? 
Member states' police services have been considered as 'non-judicial authorities' by the CJEU in 
Case C-452/16 PPU, Poltorak. Here the Luxembourg Court concluded that the issuing of an EAW 
by a police service “does not provide the executing judicial authority with the assurance that the 
issue of that EAW has undergone such judicial approval and cannot therefore suffice to justify the 
high level of [trust] between the Member States". Such an exclusion is justified in light of the need 
 
68 See Opinion 1/09 of the Court (Full Court), 8 March 2011. 
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to respect the rule of law and the principle of separation of powers on the one hand, and the need 
to uphold mutual trust stemming from the judicialisation of criminal justice cooperation on the 
other. At the same time, the Court stressed that the concept of 'judicial authority' does not coincide 
with the narrower one of 'independent judicial authority'. According to the CJEU, this latter 
category only includes public bodies which, while participating in the administration of criminal 
justice, act independently from the executive. As a consequence, the notion of 'independent 
judicial authority' cannot encompass authorities, such as ministries or police, which are "within the 
province of the executive”.69 This is of central importance in order to ensure the correct 
implementation by EU member states of the EIO Directive. 
In the much debated Case C-216/18 PPU LM, the CJEU in particular highlighted the importance to 
secure judicial independence within the context of mutual recognition proceedings - and the EAW 
more specifically - by stressing that mutual recognition in criminal matters should be halted, by 
way of exception, when the executing judicial authority has objective, reliable, specific and 
properly updated material demonstrating that 'systemic or generalised deficiencies' affecting the 
independence of the issuing member state's judiciary expose the suspect's right to a fair trial to a 
real risk.70 With this judgment, the Court reaffirmed the centrality of the independent judicial 
oversight by both the judicial authority issuing or validating a decision to enforce criminal 
jurisdiction across borders, and the courts of the EU country where such a cross-border measure 
is to be executed. 
On the one hand, the Court confirmed that judicial authorities in the executing country have an 
independent responsibility to put a halt to a mutual recognition request if – based on the results 
of the ‘two-step test’ developed in occasion of the Aranyosi and Căldăraru71 case – it results that 
its execution would generate a real risk of violation of the concerned individual’s fundamental right 
to a fair trial before an independent tribunal. On the other hand, the CJEU established in the PPU 
LM case that the high level of judicial independence required to secure the effective judicial 
protection afforded under EU law should already be ensured at the moment when a cross-border 
decision – and most notably an EAW – adopted in the context of EU mutual recognition proceeding 
is issued. The Court referred to its decision on the Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses 
case,72 in order to emphasise the key importance of judicial independence and impartiality for fair 
trial rights to be respected. 
 
69 In Cases C-452/16 PPU Poltorak of 10 November 2016, C-477/16, PPU Kovalkovas of 10 November 2016 and C- 
453/16 PPU Özcelik, of 10 November 2016, para 35. 
70 See Case C-216/18 PPU Minister for Justice and Equality v LM (Deficiencies in the system of justice), Judgment of 
25 July 2018, para. 79. 
71 Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU Aranyosiand Căldăraru, Judgment of 5 April 2016, para. 104. 
72 Case C-64/16. 
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In May 2019, the CJEU dealt with the extent to which German public prosecutor offices could be 
considered as ‘judicial authority’ for the purpose of the EAW.73 The case originated from 
preliminary reference requests from the Irish Supreme Court, which considered the execution of 
three EAWs issued prior to judgment for the purposes of conducting a criminal prosecution 
respectively by two German public prosecutor offices (Lübeck and Zwickau). The referring Irish 
court asked the CJEU for guidance about the EU law concept of “issuing judicial authority” for the 
purposes of issuing an EAW. The CJEU held that the issuing authority in an EAW case “must be in a 
position to give assurances to the executing judicial authority that it acts independently in the 
execution of those of its responsibilities”. It added that “That independence requires that there are 
statutory rules and an institutional framework capable of guaranteeing that the issuing judicial 
authority is not exposed, when adopting a decision to issue such an arrest warrant, to any risk of 
being subject, inter alia, to an instruction in a specific case from the executive.”74  
The Court added that a clear sign of a lack of independence was the power of the Ministry of Justice 
to exert ‘external power’ to issue instructions to public prosecutor offices, and directly influence 
the latter in issuing or not a decision. The CJEU highlighted that any existing safeguards related to 
the power to issue instructions could be changed in the future “by political decisions” and that the 
existence of any possibility to be exposed to the risk of being subject – directly or indirectly – to 
“directions or instructions” from the executive would suffice to conclude the non-independence 
of the prosecutorial authority.75 It therefore concluded that German prosecutorial authorities 
cannot be considered as ‘issuing judicial authorities’ for the purposes of the EAW. The Court has in 
this way provided a uniform and autonomous interpretation of these notions or concepts for the 
purposes of EU law. 
The Court thus made it clear that ensuring effective judicial protection in the context of EAW 
proceedings requires the systematic involvement of independent judicial authorities. Not only 
does the Court confirm that the independence of judicial authorities is essential to guarantee 
effective judicial protection of individuals, but expressly requires several EU countries to either: 
align their public prosecution services with the judicial independence benchmarks mentioned 
above, or; subject their decisions to the independent judicial oversight mechanisms required to 
secure judicial protection of fundamental rights in mutual recognition cases.76 
In PPU OG and PI, the Court explicitly interpreted the concept of ‘judicial authority’ within the 
meaning of the EAW Framework Decision, and taking into account in particular the wording of 
Article 6(1) of that piece of EU legislation. Furthermore, in the case at hand the CJEU explicitly 
refers to the right to liberty. 
 
73 Joined Cases C-508/18 and C-82/19 PPU OG and PI of 27 May 2019. 
74 Ibid., Paragraph 74. 
75 Ibid. Paragraphs 83 and 86. 
76 https://www.fairtrials.org/sites/default/files/publication_pdf/CJEU_27_May_2019_cases_IP_LB_final.pdf  
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At the same time, in a context where there is no guarantee that cross-border investigative 
measures are subject to effective judicial oversight in the country of issuance or execution, the 
question arises as to how to ensure the sufficient level of judicial protection required by EU law to 
adequately safeguard other fundamental rights, such as the right to privacy, which might be 
negatively impacted by the execution of an order mandating a private company to provide 
investigating or prosecuting actors access to personal data. The question applies to both EIOs (in 
cases where they are issued and executed by judicial authorities that are not independent, or in 
cases where they are only ‘formally’ issued, validated and/or executed by a judicial authority) and, 
to a different extent, to the Commission proposal on e-evidence.  
As far as the EIO is concerned, it is worth remembering that several of the different authorities 
currently listed as ‘competent for issuing EIOs’77 are not recognised as judicial authorities across 
the EU. For instance, it was noted that Italy’s criminal procedural law does not make it possible to 
consider UK barristers’ associations as judicial authorities. In practice, an EIO written by a UK 
barristers’ association might be considered a valid measure (and consequently executed) by Italian 
authorities, provided that it is signed by a UK court. And yet, securing effective scrutiny by an 
independent judicial scrutiny appears central in the context of EIO proceedings. This emerges, for 
instance, from the fact that member state courts are starting to interrogate the CJEU as to the type 
of the level of legal protection and type of remedies to be afforded in the country of issuing to 
persons other than the accused, who may also be subject to measures leading to the acquisition 
of electronic data78 (Whal, 2019a). 
Furthermore, while not requiring the systematic involvement of independent courts in all cases, 
the EIO still systematically relies upon direct contact between competent judicial authorities in 
both the issuing and executing state. Such direct contact is designed to allow for the assessment 
of the existence of the circumstances in the presence of which the principle of mutual recognition 
exceptionally ceases to operate. Under the EIO Directive, these circumstances also encompass 
cases where the execution of an order would unlawfully impact individuals’ right to privacy, fair 
trial, rights of the defence and the right to an effective remedy as enshrined in the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. 
According to the Court decision in PPU OG and PI, the EAW system “entails a dual level of 
protection of procedural rights and fundamental rights which must be enjoyed by the requested 
person, since in addition to the judicial protection provided at the first level, at which a national 
decision is adopted, there is the protection afforded at the second level, at which the EAW is 
issued” (paragraph 67). While the main responsibility for safeguarding fundamental rights in the 
 
77 European Judicial Network, Competent authorities, languages accepted, urgent matters and scope of the EIO 
Directive in the EU member states (https://www.ejnforum.eu/cp/registry-files/3339/Competent-authorities-
languages-accepted-scope-EIO-181218.pdf). 
78 C-324/17 (Criminal proceedings against Ivan Gavanozov). 
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EAW lies with the dual system of protection in the issuing member state, the design of existing EU 
mutual recognition in criminal matters and the case law of the CJEU reconfirm that the oversight 
regime adopted by existing mutual recognition instruments depends on the involvement of judicial 
authorities in both the issuing and executing state. 
The new e-evidence proposals would change this two-level system of protection to only one in the 
issuing EU member state (for EPO-PR and in cases where the EPO targets subscriber and access 
data); and potentially to none in the list of EU countries where prosecutors do not meet CJEU 
independence standards. Indeed, as Table 2 below shows, Germany is not the only EU member 
state among those covered by the JUD-IT project that cannot be considered as an ‘issuing judicial 
authority’ for the purposes of the EAW. Other clear cases include Austria, France, Luxembourg and 
the Netherlands.  
Table 2. JUD-IT member states prosecutorial authorities 
Country Instructions in 
Individual Cases 
from Executive 
General Guidelines 
on Policy from 
Executive 
Management 
Powers by Ministry 
of Justice  
CJEU 
‘Independence’ Test  
Austria X X X  
Belgium  X   
Bulgaria    Ѵ 
France  X X  
Germany X X X  
Greece    Ѵ 
Hungary    Ѵ 
Ireland    Ѵ 
Italy    Ѵ 
Luxembourg X  X  
Spain    Ѵ 
Sweden  X   
The Netherlands X X X  
Source: EU Justice Scoreboard, 2018; and JUD-IT Country Reports.  
As the Council of Europe’s European Commission for Democracy through Law (better known as the 
Venice Commission) put it: “While the independence of judges and the judiciary in general have 
their origin in the fundamental right for persons to a fair trial [...] the independence of prosecutors 
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and the prosecution system does not have such a common standard.”79 “[...] [T]he major reference 
texts allow for systems where the prosecution service is not independent from the executive”. 
“Nonetheless, where such systems are in place, guarantees must be provided at the level of the 
individual case to ensure that there is transparency concerning instructions that may be given.”80  
7.1.1 The involvement of judicial authorities in the issuing and executing country 
There is a qualitative difference between the role currently entrusted to the state of execution 
under existing EU instruments of mutual recognition in criminal matters, and the one reserved to 
the ‘enforcing state’ under the Commission proposal for a regulation under the e-evidence 
package. 
As already noted, the latter foresees that the executing state's authorities only possibly and 
incidentally participate in the execution phase. In such a context they do not take relevant criminal 
justice decisions with far-reaching implications for fundamental rights based on the direct 
assessment of the information provided by the issuing authorities (i.e. the information contained 
in the EPOC/EPOR-PR as well as the reasoning on necessity and proportionality), but only in the 
eventuality that a procedure for enforcement is initiated, and on the basis of the addressee's 
opposition to the order. This means that the decision whether or not to execute a cross-border 
data-gathering measure to obtain data would no longer follow a direct and systematic assessment 
by the competent executing authority of the grounds for non-recognition or non-execution of the 
issuing member state’s evidence gathering measure. The involvement and scrutiny of another 
member state’s Order would instead become dependent on the existence, content and quality of 
a prior objection raised by the company in light of the (scant) information made available in the 
order.  
The proposed regulation thus foresees a shift from a system (that of the EIO) where the judicial 
control and fundamental rights scrutiny that is “redolent of a request for evidence” is conducted 
by competent public authorities in the executing member state (Mitsilegas, 2018) to one in which 
the involvement of the latter is mainly a function of the enforcing foreign authorities’ criminal 
jurisdiction, and exercised in a way which is intermediated by the eventual hypothesis of opposition 
and non-compliance of the private company. Such move has been justified in light of 
considerations linked to the special (volatile) nature of electronic data and the different level of 
intrusiveness in fundamental rights that data-gathering measures adopted in the area of criminal 
justice have when compared to the EAW. It has furthermore been noted that in some cases the 
factor connecting a member state with the criminal proceeding would ‘only’ be the location of the 
data sought, or the fact that the company holding the data sough is established (or appointed its 
legal representative) there.  
 
79 (CDL-AD(2014)029, Opinion on the Draft amendments to the Law on the State Prosecutorial Council of Serbia, §7). 
80 (CDL-AD(2014)042, Interim Opinion on the Draft Law on the State Prosecution Office of Montenegro, § 16). 
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As consequence, in the Commission’s proposed regulation verifying that all safeguards prescribed 
by EU law in the field of criminal justice and data protection will be de jure and de facto entrusted 
exclusively to the authorities of the issuing country. However, this appear to be a dangerous choice 
in a context where different EU countries are undertaking legislative reforms (including of the 
judiciaries), which effectively weaken basic rule of law and fundamental rights protections. The 
deterioration of judicial independence and the rule of law in several EU countries, is evidence that 
respect of fundamental rights and other basic legal protections cannot always be taken for granted 
within the EU (Bárd, 2018). 
Substantial differences also existing between the limited notification' system envisaged in the 
Council's general approach on the draft Regulation and the type of judicial cooperation currently 
upholding already existing EU instruments of mutual recognition in criminal matters. In the first 
place, such notification system would not entail an automatic and systematic involvement of the 
judicial authorities of the country where an order is addressed, as it would be limited to specific 
cases and circumstances. The notification system provided by the general approach would neither 
give the competent oversight authorities of the member state where the order is addressed the 
possibility to raise fundamental rights concerns should they arise, and be different from the ones 
included in the proposed legislative text.81 Also, since the notification to the member state of 
execution would not have suspensive effect, there would be no guarantees that the access or 
transfer of data would be stopped in cases where issues are flagged. The involvement of the state 
of execution under the proposed notification system is therefore not systematic, and does not 
grant the authorities of the member state where the addressee of an order for content data is 
located with the possibility to raise non-recognition/non-execution grounds. 
Important divergences also emerge when comparing the notification system envisaged under the 
Council’s general approach on the e-evidence regulation with the one established under Art. 31 of 
the EIO Directive, which applies to the interception of telecommunications of a subject located in 
the territory of a EU country different from the ‘intercepting member state’.  
Similarly to the notification mechanism foreseen in the Council’s general approach, the one 
included in the EIO does not have a suspensive effect stricto sensu. However, according to Art. 31 
the EIO Directive the intercepting member state shall always and systematically notify the 
competent authority of the other member state concerned by the interception. Notification shall 
occur prior to the interception whereas the competent authority of the intercepting member state 
already knows (at the time of ordering the interception) that the subject of the interception is or 
will be on the territory of the notified member state.82 Lacking an ex ante notification, the 
intercepting member state shall comply with the notification duties during or immediately after 
 
81 The possibility for the service provider to oppose the execution of the Order on the basis of manifest violations of 
the Charter has also been removed in the Council General Approach on the proposal. 
82 Art. 32(1)(a). 
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the interception. Exception to the ex-ante notification requirement are furthermore only allowed 
if the intercepting member state only becomes aware that the subject of the interception is or has 
been on the territory of the notified Member State after ordering the interception.83 
Another difference concerns the possible reactions of the competent authority of the notified 
member state. Under the EIO Directive, the latter is given the possibility to notify the intercepting 
member state that the interception may not be carried out or shall be terminated by the 
competent authority of the intercepting Member State. Where necessary, the notified member 
state might also notify the intercepting members state that any material already intercepted may 
not be used, or may only be used under conditions which it shall specify. In such case, the 
competent authority of the notified member state shall inform the competent authority of the 
intercepting member state of reasons justifying those conditions. 
As such, the way of working of the proposed instrument, included as envisaged by Council general 
approach, still departs from the model of cooperation featuring current mutual recognition 
instruments, where decisions come from a judicial (or equivalent) authority in the issuing state and 
are directly addressed to a judicial authority (i.e. a judge or a prosecutor) in the member state 
where the addressee or the object concerned by the measure is located. 
7.1.2 Legal basis and the specificities of mutual recognition in EU criminal justice  
The Commission choice of Article 82(1) TFEU as the legal basis for the proposed regulation on 
European Production and Preservation Orders for electronic evidence in criminal matters has been 
a point of controversy and disagreement. 
Article 82 TFEU provides a legal basis for judicial cooperation based on mutual recognition. 
According to Art. 82(1)(a), the European Parliament and the Council shall adopt measures to lay 
down rules and procedures for ensuring recognition throughout the Union of all forms of 
judgments and judicial decisions. Only Art 82(1)(d) specifically refers to judicial cooperation 
between judicial or equivalent authorities. Art. 82 (1) (a) TFEU does not require the involvement 
of judicial authorities in two member states as an obligatory element of mutual recognition.  
In some areas of EU law, the principle of mutual recognition is fully respected when a judicial 
decision of an authority in a member state has legal effects in another member state, without the 
prior intervention of another authority in that other member state. At the same time, while this 
form of mutual recognition has been already established in other areas of EU legislation, such as 
in civil matters, and in the internal market, it has never been applied to EU legislation in criminal 
matters. There is a fundamental difference between the mutual recognition principle in the 
context of criminal law, and other areas of European law such as civil and private law.  
 
83 Art. 32(1)(b). 
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While private and commercial law decisions can also have far-reaching implication on individuals’ 
rights, measures adopted in the field of criminal law are based on a very specific relationship 
between the state and the individual. Criminal justice decisions systematically impinge on 
fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals, and they encroach upon punitive powers at the 
heart of member states' sovereignty. The latter have agreed over the years to give up some of their 
longstanding prerogatives to set up a system of unprecedented cooperation. Yet, this has been 
possible within a context where a number of safeguards are guaranteed. Oversight of judicial 
authorities of other member states decisions' compliance with fundamental rights standards set 
out in the EU Charter and in national constitutions appears as a crucial requirement in that respect. 
When it comes to criminal justice cooperation there are not only very sensitive (sovereign) 
interests at stakes, but disputes in criminal cases also involve a relationship between two unequal 
parties. The prosecution has the 'machinery of the state behind it' and acts adopted in the context 
of criminal investigations and/or prosecution might have far-reaching consequence for the 
fundamental rights of suspects or accused persons.84 Unlike in the other areas of EU law where 
the principle of mutual recognition applies, abuses of mutual trust and mutual recognition in the 
criminal justice area ‘have different, considerably graver consequences for the individual.’ (Bárd, 
2018). Bard observed how in the context of criminal justice cooperation, faulty judgments but also 
blind trust and automatic recognition of foreign measures will in all cases and necessarily result in 
individual rights' infringements, but also rule of law and human rights violations. As a consequence, 
she notes how in the criminal justice domain it is only allowed to presume the good intentions and 
adherence of member states to Article 2 TEU values, which makes the need to ensure adequate 
judicial scrutiny by the competent authorities of the member state of execution of cross-border 
decisions even more compelling. 
In a letter adopted in reaction to the Commission e-evidence proposal, Members of the Council 
further stressed that the “tried and tested practice of mutual recognition” in criminal matters 
would be “largely abandoned” in a context where the judicial authorities of member states 
concerned by a cross-border proceeding are no longer required to cooperate among them.85 In 
one of the first working documents adopted after the publication of the Commission's proposal, 
the authors (rapporteur Birgit Sippel, and shadow rapporteur Nuno Melo) from the European 
Parliament's LIBE Committee recalled the importance to interpret EU primary law provisions 
related to criminal justice strictly in order to avoid a "non-solicited and hidden Treaty change”.86 
The authors of the working paper also noted that all past criminal justice mutual recognition 
 
84 Fair Trials (2019), Consultation paper on cross-border access to electronic data. 
85 Ministries of Justice of Germany, The Netherlands, Czech Republic, Finland, Latvia, Sweden, Hungary, Greece (2018), 
Letter to Mrs Vĕra Jourová, 20 November. 
86 European Parliament, Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, 2nd Working Document (A) on the 
proposal for a Regulation on European Production and Preservation Orders for electronic evidence in criminal matters 
(2018/0108 (COD)) - Scope of application and relation with other instruments, 24 January 2019, p 3. 
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instruments that have ‘explicitly been based on Article 82(1)(a), have been targeted at judicial 
authorities and prescribed the recognition of judgments and judicial decisions’.87 Arguing that the 
main objective of the proposal is precisely not to involve the judicial authority in the country where 
the order is addressed, the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) has also questioned the 
appropriateness of the Commission's choice of legal basis.88 
In the EU legal system, the choice of the appropriate legal basis has a ‘constitutional significance’. 
Having only conferred powers, the EU must strictly link the acts it adopts to the Treaty provisions 
that actually empower it to adopt such acts (Docksey, 2018). According to the Court of 
Luxembourg, an act of the Union is strictly linked to a Treaty provision when the “main aim or 
component” of the measure in question is in line with the one underpinning the selected legal 
basis.89 Direct public-private cooperation for cross-border gathering and transfer of data differs 
substantially from the type of cooperation that article 82 TFEU prescribes for judicial cooperation 
in criminal matters. 
The landmark CJEU (Grand Chamber) Opinion on the draft EU-Canada Passenger Name Records 
(PNR) Agreement90 also provides guidelines that are useful for the selection of the appropriate 
legal basis of EU initiatives aimed at enabling the cross-border collection, storage, processing, 
analysis and exchange of information for the purpose of - inter alia - detecting and investigating 
crime. In its Opinion in case A-1/15 the Court analysed the aim and content of the envisaged PNR 
Canada agreement. In accordance with the consolidated case-law on the choice of the legal basis, 
CJEU recalled how the latter must be founded on objective criteria amenable to judicial review, 
and how those objective criteria include the purpose and the content of the act at issue. 
With regard to the draft agreement at hand, the Court of Luxembourg withheld a double legal 
basis: protection of personal data (Art. 16 TFEU) and police cooperation in criminal matters 
concerning the exchange of information (Art 87(2)(a)). The CJEU found that the purpose of the 
agreement under scrutiny was in fact to combat terrorism and serious transnational crime "while 
safeguarding the right to respect for privacy and the right to protection of personal data”. To 
reconcile the two objectives - both recognised by the Court as constituting two essential 
components of the Agreement - the legal basis was therefore to be found under the headings of 
police cooperation along with data protection, and not public security and the activities of the state 
in areas of criminal law (Carrera and Mitsilegas, 2017).  
 
87 Ibid. p. 5. 
88 European Data Protection Board (2018), 'Opinion 23/2018 on Commission proposals on European Production and 
Preservation Orders for electronic evidence in criminal matters (Art. 70.1.b)', Brussels, 26 September. 
89 Case C-178/03 Commission of the European Communities v European Parliament and Council of the European 
Union, para. 1. 
90 Opinion 1/15 of the Court (Grand Chamber) on the EU-Canada PNR Agreement, 26 July 2017, para. 103, and; para 
108 of the opinion of the advocate general in this case. 
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The CJEU Opinion PNR Canada agreement also dealt with the question of whether Article 82(1) 
constituted the appropriate legal basis for a system of international cooperation between a private 
provider based in the EU and a law enforcement authority in a third country. Upon the 
consideration that none of the provisions of the envisaged agreement referred to facilitating 
judicial cooperation, the Court discarded Article 82 TFEU on judicial cooperation on criminal 
matters as possible legal basis. The CJEU stated in particular that Article 82(1)(d) can only provide 
the legal basis for measures facilitate cooperation between two judicial authorities, while 
cooperation between law enforcement and private providers is not covered.91 
Being an initiative directed at enabling direct enforcement by private companies of cross-border 
measures issued by member states’ investigating or prosecuting authorities, the proposed 
regulation appears to lack one of the essential elements that so far have characterised EU mutual 
recognition instruments of judicial cooperation in criminal matters, and most notably the direct 
and systematic contact between competent judicial authorities (including both judges and 
prosecutors) in the issuing and executing member state. As a consequence, it appears that purpose 
and the content of the proposal at issue fall outside the scope of the Treaty provision chosen for 
its legal basis by the Commission.  
Expert consulted during the JUD-IT project have furthermore raised doubts as to the possibility for 
the EU to use Art. 82 of the TFEU to adopt initiatives that would de facto lead to the abandonment 
of member states sovereignty to execute the law in their respective territory. In fact, Article 89 of 
the TFEU indicates that the EU can adopt measures empowering member states' to operate in the 
territory other EU country only when cooperation occurs 'in liaison and in agreement with the 
authorities' of the latter. 
In relation to the protection of personal data, the Commission's proposal does explicitly refer to 
the need to respect the fundamental right to the protection of personal data as enshrined both in 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Treaties (Article 16(1) of the TFEU). As mirrored in 
Recital 56 of the proposed regulation, this imperative is to a large extent addressed by recalling 
that it is the responsibility of member states to ensure that personal data are protected by making 
sure they are only processed in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and Directive (EU) 
2016/680. This nevertheless leaves open the question of whether the protection offered by these 
instruments (adopted on the basis of Article 16(2) of the TFEU) shall be deemed sufficient in light 
of the new data processing practices brought about by the proposals.  
7.2 Conflicts of laws 
A specific set of challenges emerge in relation to data requests issued by EU countries’ investigating 
and prosecuting authorities and addressed directly to service providers in the US. Companies 
 
91 Para. 102. 
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falling under US jurisdiction can provide non-content data to foreign authorities, but pursuant to 
Section 2701(2) of the Electronic Communications and Privacy Act 1986 (ECPA) they are prohibited 
from sharing content data with foreign law enforcement authorities. The SCA, which is contained 
in Title II of the ECPA, acts in fact as a blocking statute that limits the possibility for foreign 
governments to directly request content data held by IT companies in the US. It does so by 
subjecting their possibility of accessing electronic information to the requirement of ex ante 
independent judicial validation by a US court. The content of electronic communications might 
only be produced when a US federal judge has been satisfied of the existence of ‘probable cause’.92 
On the other hand, even when an order meets the probable cause standard, service providers in 
the US are not allowed to respond to direct orders (or: ‘requests’) from EU authorities. Some 
exceptions to such rules have been introduced in practice in relation to ‘emergency requests’. The 
US law allows US service providers to respond to these requests following the policies and 
standards set out by the service providers themselves and irrespective of the ‘probable cause’ 
standards being met.93  
The purpose of the Commission's proposal to compel service providers established outside the 
Union to appoint legal representatives in the EU is to turn the process of serving a Production 
Order into an 'EU internal process'. However, these service providers would remain subject to the 
legal obligations in force in the (non-EU) foreign legal system where they are established (e.g. the 
US). Therefore, under the proposed regulation the risks of a conflict of laws are still likely to arise 
when European Production or Preservation Orders are issued for content data falling under US 
jurisdiction. As already noted, the Fourth Amendment requires a US judicial authority to issue a 
warrant with probable cause to provide foreign authorities access to the content of electronic 
communications. It is far from certain that in the absence of such a warrant, US service providers 
will be able to provide EU member state authorities access to the requested data without incurring 
liabilities under US law. 
 
92 For certain categories of information, the ECPA would require less than probable cause. For instance, the statute 
specifies that data or electronic communications that have been in storage for more than 180 days can be produced 
upon the issue of a subpoena or a court order, which occurs when a judge is persuaded of the existence of ‘specific 
and articulable facts’ enabling the assumption that the requested data are relevant to an ongoing criminal 
investigation. Still, federal appellate courts have progressively extended application of the probable cause requirement 
to these requests. In the United States v Warshak case (2010), the Sixth Circuit broadened the interpretation of the 
Fourth Amendment’s guarantees expanding the probable cause standard also to communication that has been in 
storage for more than 180 days. In Riley v California (2014), the Supreme Court stated that “the police generally may 
not, without a warrant, search digital information on a mobile phone seized from an individual who has been arrested”. 
In the Carpenter v United States case (2018), the Supreme Court ruled that in order to obtain mobile phone tracking 
information (metadata/non-content), law enforcement authorities needed a warrant. 
93 European Commission (2018), “Impact Assessment accompanying the document Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on European Production and Preservation Orders for electronic evidence in 
criminal matters and Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down harmonised 
rules on the appointment of legal representatives for the purpose of gathering evidence in criminal proceedings”, 
SWD/2018/118 final – 2018/0108 (COD), 17 April, p. 84-85. 
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The proposed regulation requires the addressee to inform the issuing authority of cases where 
compliance with the order would cause infringements of the law(s) of a third country. Based on 
the “reasoned objection” of the service provider, the issuing authority may choose whether to 
withdraw the order or to uphold it.94 In the latter option, the case would be transferred to the 
competent court of the issuing member state. It would therefore be up to the authorities of the 
latter to decide if the law of the third country applies to the case, if a conflict of law actually exists, 
and to assess the lawfulness of the foreign legislation protecting the data against access. 
In carrying out the assessment, the issuing member state’s court would have to decide whether 
the law of a third country is intended to protect legitimate interests (e.g. fundamental rights, or 
national security) or instead to shield illegal activities from law enforcement requests for data 
access. The proposed regulation requires the issuing member state’s court that “ascertain[s]” the 
existence of a conflict of jurisdiction to request the “central authorities” of the third country 
concerned to express their opinion over the conflicting obligations. If a conflict of law is found to 
exist (e.g. in the eventuality that the data request by the EU authority is directed at a company 
subject to US jurisdiction), the authority seeking the data will have to go through the MLA process. 
In these cases, the time required to execute the investigative measure originally provided for in 
the order would be longer that the one typically required to request and obtain data across borders 
directly through existing MLA channels. 
7.3 Constitutional and fundamental rights challenges  
7.3.1 Constitutional identities in the EU and the essence of constitutional rights  
The extent to which national constitutional specificities and different legal traditions provide limits 
to criminal justice cooperation between member states has long constituted a matter of debate 
among EU and member states’ judicial authorities, as well as between legal scholars.  
The relationship between EU law and national constitutional law in the context of the operation of 
the principle of mutual recognition in criminal matters has been examined in the case of Melloni.95 
In such case, the Court decided that the higher level of fundamental rights protection ensured by 
national constitutional law cannot compromise the primacy of EU secondary law (the European 
Arrest Warrant Framework Decision as amended by the Framework decision in judgements in 
absentia, interpreted in light of the Charter). 
By establishing that member state are, in principle, obliged to act upon a EAW, the CJEU has a 
adopted a ‘teleological interpretation’ (Mitsilegas, 2015) of the relevant legal basis for such mutual 
recognition instrument, and backed a literal understanding of Art. 4a(1) of the EAW Framework 
 
94 See in particular Articles 15(1), 16(1) and 2(1) of the proposed regulation. 
95 Case C-399/11, Melloni, Judgement of 26 February 2013. 
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Decision by finding that this provisions restricts the opportunities for refusing to execute an EAW.96 
The Melloni judgement has thus in principle deprived national executing authorities of any 
discretion to examine the compatibility of the execution of a EAW with fundamental rights in a 
wide range of cases involving in absentia rulings. By giving priority to the effectiveness of mutual 
recognition based on presumed mutual over national constitutional law which provides a high 
protection of fundamental rights, the Court has interpreted fundamental rights in a restrictive 
manner. And yet, the focus put by the Court on the importance to operationalize a system of quasi-
automatic mutual recognition can raise serious challenges from the perspective of effective 
fundamental rights protection.  
According to Lenaerts, “the executing authority may not make the execution of an EAW conditional 
upon compliance with the level of fundamental rights protection provided by its own constitution 
where that level is higher than that provided by EU law…. [imposing] its own constitutional 
standards…would be the beginning of the end of principle of mutual trust”. However, he has also 
underlined however that “mutual recognition of judgments should not operate to the detriment 
of fundamental rights” (Lenaerts, 2017, pp. 814 and 823).  
Bárd and van Ballegooij noted that the tendency of the CJEU to limit the discretion of executing 
judicial authorities not only misinterprets the principle of mutual recognition, but also negates the 
concept that fundamental rights are a direct source of EU law in the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights (Bárd, and van Ballegooij, 2019). Moreover, van Ballegooij (2015) has argued that “Limiting 
the discretion of executing judicial authorities, claiming that it is good for mutual recognition fails 
to understand the need to recognise judicial decisions as opposed to enforcing them directly based 
on compliance with the standards of the home state (home state control)”. 
The CJEU seems to have later accepted such arguments, as confirmed by the conclusions of 
judgements such as Aranyosi and Caldararu, in the context of which the Court recognised that that 
the principle of mutual trust "may be limited where the execution of an EAW is liable to give rise 
to breaches of the prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment enshrined in 
Article 4 EU Charter”. In its ruling Minister for Justice and Equality v LM of 25 July 2018,97 the Court 
extended the two-step Aranyosi test to cases where the rule of law is at stake, and the right to an 
effective remedy and fair trials envisaged in Art. 47 of the EU Charter. 
The respect of national constitutional traditions and identities is specifically mentioned in Article 
4(2) of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU), and Article 67(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU). Recent normative developments in the EU criminal justice field 
show that the execution of a law enforcement or criminal justice measure cannot translate into an 
unlawful interference with a core nucleus of legal values with which all member states must 
 
96 Para 41.  
97 Case C-216/18 PPU Minister for Justice and Equality v LM (Deficiencies in the system of justice), Judgment of 25 July 
2018. 
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comply.98 Such a nucleus includes the primary fundamental rights and rule of law standards that 
are provided for by both the EU and/or the executing Member State’s constitutional and legal 
systems (Lenaerts, 2015).  
The EIO model has also enshrined these national diversities by including as express ground for non-
execution which can be raised by the executing authority upon the finding that complying with the 
formalities and procedures expressly indicated by the issuing authority would be contrary to the 
fundamental principles of law of the executing state.99 Some of these may relate - directly or 
indirectly - to fundamental rights, but some other equally important elements may correspond 
with other key legal criteria such as national security interests.100 
National constitutional courts have already signaled the limits of the primacy of EU law and the 
mutual recognition principle, and the limits of 'blind' automatic operability of mutual recognition 
in criminal justice matters. The relationship between EU law and constitutional and criminal justice 
traditions remains an evolving and contested one. Some national constitutional courts have 
remained rather consistent regarding 'uncritical trust' in cases of mutual recognition of judicial 
decisions in criminal matters, as the follow up of the CJEU Melloni case clearly demonstrates. 
Germany constitutes a case in point, as exemplified by the German Constitutional Court's decision 
of 15 December 2015.101  Such decision concerns an identity check for a person subject to a EAW 
based on a verdict in absentia and the rights of the arrested person to challenge such decision. The 
BVerfG held that mutual trust has limits and that it can be challenged “if there are indications based 
on facts that the requirements indispensable for the protection of human dignity would not be 
complied with in the case of an extradition”. The requirement to carry out a "constitutional identity 
review” by the Constitutional Court - which may lead to situations where EU criminal law may be 
inapplicable - remains, to date, unresolved. Mitsilegas concluded that the German Constitutional 
Court ‘introduced the requirement of identity review of measures implementing the EAW when 
the principle of human dignity is at stake’ (Mitsilegas, 2019, p. 425).  
The existence of the state’s responsibility to protect its citizens’ fundamental rights in line with 
national constitutional requirements has been considered by German Constitutional Court also 
with regard to international cooperation measures directed at enabling cross-border access to 
 
98 Before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, EU mutual recognition instruments contained references to the 
respect of fundamental rights but did not include a specific ground for refusal in this regard. Post-Lisbon Mutual 
recognition instruments foresee grounds for refusal based on a fundamental rights assessment in the country of 
execution. See for instance, Art. 8(1(f) and Art. 19(1)(h) Regulation (EU) 2018/1805/EU of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on the mutual recognition of freezing orders and confiscation orders. The Regulation foresees a 
ground for non-recognition based on fundamental rights, although its exercise is only possible under very strict 
conditions. 
99 Art. 9(2) of the EIO Directive. 
100 Art. 11(1)(b) of the EO Directive. 
101 BVerfG Order, 15 December 2015 (2 BvR 2735/14). 
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personal data.102 In in its ruling on Art. 32 of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, as 
ratified by the German legislature, the German Constitutional Court considered the existence of 
the state’s responsibility to protect its citizens against fundamental rights violations resulting from 
cross-border access to personal data. In the case at hand, the BVerfG dismissed the complaint 
because of the applicant’s failure to substantiate the alleged fundamental rights violation. 
And yet, an opposite conclusion was reached by a dissenting opinion arguing that the Cybercrime 
Convention’s provision under scrutiny violated the applicant’s privacy rights, most notably by 
authorising foreign authorities to access personal data without providing effective protection 
against violations of privacy rights resulting from such access.103 In his assessment of the 
Commission’s proposal on electronic evidence, Böse reported how the Upper House of the German 
Parliament representing the states (Bundesrat) referred to the Constitutional Court’s ruling to raise 
similar objections with regard to the envisaged Regulation (Böse, 2018). 
In Spain, the Constitutional Tribunal response to the CJEU Melloni judgment represents another 
illustrative example that the automaticity of mutual recognition in EU criminal law remains 
constitutionally unsettled and unresolved. The Spanish Constitutional Court found a key 
conundrum: the CJEU ruling in Melloni versus its own case law covering suspects rights in the scope 
of trials in absentia. As Bachmaier Winter has rightly pointed out, instead of creating a direct clash 
with Luxembourg, the Spanish Court “compromised and made an intelligent move, which consisted 
in presenting those contradicting positions as compatible” (Bachmaier Winter, 2019, p. 408).  
The Spanish Constitutional Court agreed to revise its own jurisprudence on trials in absentia while 
not expressly acknowledging that this resulted from the supremacy of EU criminal law in the 
Spanish constitutional system. It held that the Spanish Constitution’s recognition of the primacy of 
EU law (Art. 93 Spanish Constitution) is dependent upon limits emerging from “the respect for the 
sovereignty of the state, our basic constitutional structures and value system and fundamental 
principles, where the fundamental rights hold their own substantive nature” (Art. 10 Spanish 
Constitution).104 Centrally, the Spanish Constitutional Court concluded that in the occurrence of 
“the unlikely situation” where EU law would end up incompatible with the Spanish Constitution, 
the preservation of the sovereignty of the Spanish people and the supremacy of the Constitution 
could in the last instance lead the Court to tackle such problems.105  
Sweden is another case in point, where principles of freedom of the press and freedom of 
expression find particular constitutional protections in its national legal system (SE). This 
 
102 Bundesverfassungsgericht [German Federal Constitutional Court], Decision of 21 June 2016, 2 BvR 637/09, official 
court reports [BVerfGE], Vol. 142, p. 234, 249 and following. 
103 Dissenting opinion of Judge Huber, ibidem, at 257 and following. 
104 Declaration 1/2004 (DCC). 
105 DTC 1/2004, 13 December, FJ 4. 
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sometimes constitutes a barrier to mutual recognition-based instruments as their domestic courts 
will not accept items of evidence in cases where the legal representative has not been informed. 
7.3.2 Privacy 
The proposed E-evidence regulation distinguishes between content data and transactional data on 
the one hand, and access data and subscriber information on the other.106 The proposal foresees 
in particular that different authorities would be responsible for issuing the orders depending on 
the type of data sought.107 Prior involvement of a judge or court would only be required for 
production orders concerning two categories of data (content and transactional) which are 
considered as having a high "level of interference” with fundamental rights. These data could be 
requested for offences capable of resulting in a custodial sentence of at least three years. Access 
and subscriber data could instead be requested for all categories of crime and directly by 
prosecutors, without necessary requiring the intervention of a court or judge.  
The idea according to which subscriber and access data systematically deserve a lower level of 
protection appears has been considered in tension with the EU data protection law and the basic 
standards that the latter generally applies to all personal data. Article 8 of the EU Charter applies 
to any processing of personal data. Although it is true that some special types of personal data are 
characterised as ‘sensitive’ and consequently granted additional protection, and that certain types 
of processing are regarded as involving a higher risk and thus subject to more stringent rules, this 
should not be interpreted as allowing gradations depriving certain categories of information of 
basic data protection standards.  
According to the Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the proposal, personal data covered by 
the envisaged regulation are ‘protected and may only be processed in accordance with the EU data 
protection acquis, ad most notably with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the 
Data Protection Directive for Police and Criminal Justice Authorities (Law Enforcement Data 
Protection Directive)’.108 The proposal also recalls that the regulation cannot alter fundamental 
rights obligations derived from Article 6 TEU. At the same time, the proposal does not provide a 
clear justification for the lowering of substantial and procedural safeguards that is envisaged for 
subscriber and access data. 
The proposal seems to base the decision to grant a lower level of safeguards to subscriber and 
access data upon the assumption that access to such information only entail limited levels of 
interference with fundamental rights. It does however not provide detailed explanations as to how 
different such interference would be for subscriber and access data. Furthermore, it is not clear 
why the levels of interference would be coincidental for these two categories, and for instance in 
 
106 Article 2(7)-(10) of the proposed regulation. 
107 Article 5 of the proposed regulation. 
108 Recital 20 of the proposed regulation. 
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which way the level of interference with fundamental rights of access data can always be 
considered ‘similar to that of subscriber data’.109  
The presumption according to which requests of and access to these categories of non-content 
data (can be a priori and in all cases considered less intrusive from a fundamental rights perspective 
is also contradicted by the fact that, in several EU countries covered by the JUD-IT project, a court 
authorisation is necessary for these specific type of electronic information.110  
Furthermore, making a clear-cut distinction between specific categories of data is not always an 
easy task. This is particularly the case when it comes to dynamic IP addresses. In fact, dynamic IP 
addresses are assigned to specific users each time they log into the account(s) they have on specific 
devices and/or networks. Consequently, in order to identify the user to which a dynamic IP address 
was assigned to a specific point in time, investigating and prosecuting authorities need to collect 
transactional and access data. Without the latter it would in fact not be possible to determine the 
identity of the persons behind the IP address. Depending on the specific circumstances of a case 
at hand, this type of data might therefore require higher level of protection that the one currently 
foreseen in the draft regulation. Under the proposed regulation the risk exists that the issuing 
authority qualify these type of dynamic IP addresses as subscriber information, while instead they 
constitute traffic data revealing circumstances and facts connected to the electronic 
communication. In such cases, these data would require a higher level of protection that the one 
currently foreseen in the draft regulation for subscriber or access data111 
The CJEU has ruled that when metadata (such as traffic data and location data) provides the means 
of establishing a profile of the individuals concerned that such information is no less sensitive, 
having regard to the right to privacy, than the actual content of communications.112 The ECtHR has 
also explicitly set aside arguments according to which the acquisition of "related communications 
data” (encompassing different instances of "traffic data”) would necessarily be less intrusive than 
the acquisition of the communications' content.113 These issues must be considered in addition to 
the fundamental requirement of conditioning the acquisition by a public authority of 
 
109 Recital 21 of the proposed regulation. 
110 See Cyber Crime Committee, T-CY (2001), Rules on obtaining subscriber information, pp. 17-20 See also T- 
CY(2018)26, Conditions for obtaining subscriber information in relation to dynamic versus static IP addresses: overview 
of relevant court decision and developments, p. 5-6. 
111 Case C‑582/14, Patrick Breyer v Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 
112 Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15 Tele2 Sverige AB, op. cit. 
113 See the judgment in Big Brother Watch and Others, op. cit., para. 356. The judgment considers the compatibility 
with ECtHR standards of three different, discrete regimes, and for each of them carefully identifies the relevant 
interference(s) with fundamental rights, the compatibility of which had to be assessed separately, in the Court’s view. 
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communications data from a communications services provider to prior review by a court or 
independent administrative body.114 
The data-categorisation challenge becomes even more problematic when considering the absence 
in the proposed regulation of specific rules on inadmissibility for wrongly categorized data. It might 
therefore become possible that data collected according to the wrong procedure (e.g. without the 
required independent judicial validation) could still be admitted as evidence in some EU member 
states. A Task Force participant observed that courts in some EU countries (e.g. Belgium) will not 
dismiss a case 'simply because' the data has been wrongly categorized in the pre-trial phase. 
Indeed, rules on admissibility of evidence in criminal proceedings vary greatly across the Union, 
nor a clear EU legal framework of admissibility of evidence yet exists. 
The e-evidence regulation proposal also foresees the introduction of new (sub)-category of 'access 
data' which does not match with the one provided under already existing EU legal instruments 
(Warken, 2018). While intended to be distinguished from traffic data, access data still remains 
vaguely defined compared to the other already existing categories.115 The creation of new sub-
categories of data to which different level of protections are attached appear however in tension 
with the proposal - made in the draft of the so-called ePrivacy Regulation116 - to consider that 
"electronic communications data should be defined in a sufficiently broad and technology neutral 
way so as to encompass any information concerning the content transmitted or exchanged 
(electronic communications content) and the information concerning an end-user of electronic 
communications services processed for the purposes of transmitting”.  
Another privacy-related challenge relates to the duty to inform the data subjects whose 
information is being sought. Article 11 of the proposed e-evidence regulation requires service 
providers to take 'necessary measures' directed at ensuring the confidentiality of the order and 
aimed at preventing that persons affected by the order become aware that they are investigated. 
The Commission foresees that the secrecy of the investigative measures should be guaranteed as 
long as the issuing authority deems it 'necessary and proportionate to avoid obstructing the 
relevant criminal proceedings'. At the same time, the proposal does not require the issuing 
authority to include in the certificate accompanying the order any explanations justifying the 
necessity to keep the investigative measure secret. While it is not for the service providers to assess 
the necessity of keeping an Order secret, such information could indeed be valuable in order to 
 
114 Ibid. paras 463, 466 and 467.  
115 EDPB, Opinion 23/2018 on Commission proposals on European Production and Preservation Orders for electronic 
evidence in criminal matters (Art. 70.1.b), p. 12. 
116 Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the respect for private life and 
the protection of personal data in electronic communications and repealing Directive 2002/58/EC (Regulation on 
Privacy and Electronic Communications) COM/2017/010 final - 2017/03 (COD). 
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adequately assess whether fundamental rights objections, as foreseen in the Commission 
proposal, should be raised by the addressee of the order.  
This type of requests (so called non-disclosure orders) could potentially be issued in all criminal 
proceedings, and would not necessarily be restricted to cases where notification to the data 
subject would put life, limb or property into serious danger.117 In case of production orders 
targeting subscriber and access data, as well as of preservation orders, this sort of non-disclosure 
orders could also be issued without prior validation by an independent judicial authority. The 
involvement of such authority would not necessarily entail informing the data subject of the 
ongoing criminal investigation, but would instead ensure an additional level of scrutiny over the 
necessity and proportionality of the order, as well as of the decision to maintain the secrecy of the 
investigative measure. Furthermore, there are no provision in the proposal that would allow the 
service providers (let alone the competent oversight authority in the state of execution) to require 
further information when deemed necessary to verify the existence of legitimate grounds justifying 
the issuing of a non-disclosure order. 
The Commission's proposal does not specify whether the service providers' obligation to refrain 
from informing the data subjects applies to all orders, or just when the issuing authorities expressly 
require to do so (in the accompanying certificate). This last option was instead preferred by the 
Council, which in its general approach explicitly requires service providers to refrain from notifying 
the data subject, except when otherwise (expressly) indicated by the issuing authority.118 
The restrictive approach to notification restrictions adopted by the Council becomes especially 
concerning in light of the draft regulation's wide scope of application ratione persona. Not only does 
the proposed measure provide a definition of 'service providers' that covers a wide range of 
businesses119 but, as the EDPB noted, the non-disclosure orders foreseen by the proposed 
regulation could be addressed to both data controllers and processors (in the sense of the GDPR). 
At the same time, a secret order issued to the data processors would prevent the latter from having 
the possibility to notify the data controller of the existence of a production or preservation order. 
In this situation, however, data subjects' rights might be circumvented. 
According to the GDPR, a processor only acts on the instructions given by the controller. This means 
that it is the responsibility of the controller to ensure the rights of data subjects are respected, and 
to provide them with the relevant information, including with regards to recipients of their data, 
for instance in the context of the exercise of their right of access. On the other hand, while the 
draft regulation allegedly follows a controller first principle, it does not expressly prevent 
 
117 European Parliament, 6th working Document (A), 01 April 2019, p, 3. 
118 See article 11(1)-(2) of the Council "Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on European 
production and preservation orders for electronic evidence in criminal matters - general approach", Brussels, 26 
November 2018. 
119 Article 2 (3) (c) of the proposed Regulation on e-Evidence. 
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investigating and prosecuting authorities to address requests for data (limited not only personal 
data subject to the GDPR) to the addressee deemed as most appropriate (including processors), 
regardless of the data protection rules applicable. The EDPB therefore stressed that data subjects 
benefitting from the application of the GDPR may not be able to exercise their rights efficiently if, 
as a consequence of an order served upon a processor providing services for the controller (e.g. 
storing data), the latter is not in a position to provide complete information to the data subject.120 
In cases where the service provider must refrain from notifying the subject concerned by the order 
the draft regulation foresees an express duty for the issuing authority to inform the person whose 
data are being sought 'without undue delay'. And even then, the information might be delayed as 
long it is necessary and proportionate to avoid obstructing the relevant criminal proceedings.121 
The assessment of the necessity and proportionality to keep the order secret will be conducted 
exclusively by the issuing authority (in some cases represented by prosecutors), without any 
possibility for the country of execution to question the assessment conducted by a foreign 
investigating and prosecuting authority. Also, the duty to inform the suspect or accused person 
would only subsist as far as production orders are concerned, since the proposal does not foresee 
any obligation for the issuing authority to notify the data subject in case of preservations orders 
obliging the service providers to refrain from notification. 
The so-called 'Police Directive'122 provides a general obligation for law enforcement authorities to 
inform data subjects, and deviations to the principle of notification of the data subject are clearly 
framed as exceptions to the rule. On the contrary, in the proposed e-evidence regulation it is the 
opposite, since a (partial and limited) obligation for the issuing authority to notify the data subject 
only exists when a request is made to the service providers to refrain from informing the person 
whose data are being sought. This is where the nexus between effective remedies, fair trials and the 
right of privacy emerges in sharp relief. 
7.3.3 Effective remedies and fair trials  
The right to an effective remedy is crucial to the effectiveness of the rights bestowed upon 
individuals by the EU Charter and other international and regional human rights instruments, 
including the ECHR (Hofmann, 2014, p. 1211). The effectiveness of remedies depends, in turn, on 
the existence, and accessibility of remedial avenues, including both institutions and procedures 
 
120 EDPB, Opinion 23/2018 on Commission proposals on European Production and Preservation Orders for electronic 
evidence in criminal matters (Art. 70.1.b), p. 10. 
121 See article 11(2)-(3) of the proposed regulation. 
122 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural 
persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, 
investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free 
movement of such data. 
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capable of preventing and redressing abuses related to the use of coercive powers, including in the 
context of criminal proceedings.123 
As outlined in Sections 1 and 2 of this Report, the EIO Directive envisages a set of suspects’ rights 
and guarantees aimed at ensuring compliance with Article 47 of the EU Charter. At the same time, 
JUD-IT research has shown that the effective delivery of these EIO protections of the rights of the 
defence are often subject to a number of practical and legal obstacles in many EU member states 
under investigation.  
Ensuring access to effective remedies against fundamental rights abuses that might derive from 
the introduction and use of the data-gathering measures envisaged in the proposed e-evidence 
regulation would also become difficult in a context where there are no guarantees - for suspect 
and accused persons, as well as for third parties concerned - of a systematic ex ante involvement 
of independent judicial or administrative authorities in neither the state of issuing or execution. 
The delivery of ex ante remedies would also be hampered by the lack of a duty to inform, in a 
timely manner, the different categories of data subjects potentially affected by the proposed 
measure. These include not only the suspects directly concerned by the criminal investigation, but 
also third parties whose rights might be negatively affected by the investigative measures. 
The possibility that information pertaining to individuals different from the suspect or accused 
persons are collected or preserved is intrinsic in the execution of data-gathering measures adopted 
in the context of a criminal proceeding. In some cases, third parties' data are collected or preserved 
because such information is of direct relevance for the investigation or prosecution of a crime. 
However, it might also happen that third parties' data are collected or preserved only incidentally, 
since they do not constitute the direct target of the investigative measure. Against this backdrop, 
allowing national data protection authorities to formally exercise the rights of data subjects 
'indirectly' (as instead provided under national laws of EU several countries), and being notified 
when an order is issued, appears as particularly crucial. 
While it is clear that specific stages of investigations may require secrecy, a system that could 
potentially allow a systematic exclusion of notification regarding the gathering and preservation of 
data of different categories of individuals fundamentally challenges not only existing EU privacy 
and data protection standards, but also the principle of equality of arms and the adversarial 
principle in criminal proceedings. The priority given to maintaining secrecy of the investigative 
measure (potentially until after an indictment is made), as well as late notification to the different 
 
123 These include: Directive 2010/64/EU on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings, Directive 
2012/13/EU on the right to information about rights and charges and access to the case file, Directive 2013/48/EU on 
the right of access to a lawyer and communication with relatives when arrested and detained, Directive 2016/343 on 
the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and the right to be present at one's trial, 
Directive 2016/800 on the procedural safeguards for children and Directive 2016/1919 on legal aid for suspects and 
accused persons in criminal proceedings and for requested persons in European arrest warrant proceedings. 
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categories of potentially affected individuals would make it difficult to object and/or challenge its 
legality, proportionality and necessity of an order, especially in the early stages of a proceedings.  
The e-evidence regulation clearly recognises the possibility to challenge an issuing authority's 
production order. Article 17(1) of the E-evidence proposal stipulates that the suspect or accused 
person has the "right to effective remedies against the European Production Order during the 
criminal proceedings for which the Order was issued”. According to Article 17(3), "such right to an 
effective remedy shall be exercised before a court in the issuing State in accordance with its 
national law and shall include the possibility to challenge the legality of the measure, including its 
necessity and proportionality”. It does, however only granted this is opportunity once the 
production order has already been given effect. At that point, however, it might be difficult to 
redress the negative effects of an unlawful or abusive order. Art. 7 of Directive 2012/13/EU on the 
right to information in criminal proceedings124 guarantees access to the file covering evidence on 
which the prosecution is built. And yet, investigating or prosecuting authorities may be put in a 
position to construct a case based on evidence obtained illegally through the recourse of a secretly 
adopted and implemented data-gathering measure.   
Furthermore, the proposal does not extend the right to seek remedies to the persons who are 
suspected or accused of a crime and whose data have been targeted by a preservation orders 
(EPOC-PRs). The right to effective remedy of third parties could in fact only be exercised only 
against a European Production Order. In substance, the proposal does not foresee any rights to an 
effective remedy in cases of European preservation orders. Third parties affected whose data are 
affected by preservation orders would neither be able to seek remedies. 
Further problems arise if complaint mechanisms and/or appeal procedures that can be activates 
after the order has been issued and/or executed are designed in a way that de facto undermine 
the availability of remedies.  For instance, it is concerning that the proposal does not impose upon 
the prosecuting authorities a clear obligation to formulate the orders so that, beside incriminatory 
data, they also cover information that can be used by the defence. The proposal does nor set out 
precisely the conditions upon which the suspects could request competent authorities the issuing 
of an order, and leaves the determination of such conditions to national law of the different 
member states. Nor does the proposal indicate which are the 'types of remedies' or reparations 
available to the data subjects once the latter has proved that his/her rights were abusively 
interfered with in the context of the data-gathering procedures under discussion. Also in this case 
it is left to member states the duty to specify - as a matter of national law – the ex post remedies 
available in case of abuses. 
 
124 Directive 2012/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012 on the right to information in 
criminal proceedings, L144/1. 
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7.3.4 Challenges for Business 
JUD-IT research has shown that 'domestic cooperation' between providers of internet and 
telecommunication services and national authorities of their country of establishment is generally 
viewed as positive in many member states. Cloud service providers and telecommunication 
companies have by now developed internal procedures and equipped themselves with the 
necessary human and technical resources to handle requests for data. 
The increasing pressure to respond to direct cross-border requests for data (i.e. requests 
addressed directly to service providers and outside the judicial cooperation instruments provided 
by MLATs and the EIO directive), however, expose service providers to higher risks of being in 
breach of the privacy and criminal justice laws applying in the country concerned by an incoming 
request issued by a foreign authority. 
Research conducted throughout the JUD-IT project has shown that many IT companies and cloud 
providers see an added value in harmonising common EU standards regulating access to electronic 
data for criminal investigation purposes. Such rules could reduce legal uncertainties, in particular 
by providing a legal basis for broader and smoother cross-border cooperation with authorities 
requesting data. Some companies also see the proposal as a way to define the needed safeguards 
for the challenges that arise when investigating or prosecuting authorities go directly to providers. 
A major issue that remains unresolved, however, is that initiatives aimed at making it compulsory 
for companies to respond to requests vis-à-vis the issuing authority need to ensure a higher degree 
of legal safeguards and guarantees so as to fully avoid potential liabilities under the criminal and 
data protection law of other countries under which jurisdiction they happen to operate and 
provide services.  
The Commission proposal recognises that, in some cases, service providers have the right (but not 
the duty) to challenge the orders.125 However, given the very scant information available in the 
certificates through which an order is transmitted to the companies,126 in practice the effective 
exercise of such a right can be expected to face obstacles , especially when it comes to objections 
based on fundamental rights concerns. In any case, the scrutiny by a private company can only 
constitute an ‘additional safeguard’, and not a substitute of the responsibility of states, and chiefly, 
of their judicial and data protection authorities to protect the fundamental rights of their citizens 
and any person falling under their jurisdiction.127 
Specific challenges arise when the private sector stakeholders concerned by the proposed 
measures are not major cloud service providers and IT companies, but small and medium 
 
125 See Article 14-16 of the proposed regulation. 
126 See Article 5(3) and 6(3) of the proposed regulation. 
127 Under US law, constitutional protection is instead only granted to US citizens or to subjects with a link to the US 
territory. 
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enterprises (SMEs). While high volumes of requests would only occur if a service provider has a 
high number of customers, there is a clear risk that these SMEs will simply lack the resources to 
cope directly with cross-border requests. The proposed regulation would give EU investigating and 
prosecuting authorities the possibility to issue Orders for a large variety of crimes, including non-
serious ones (virtually for all offences when it comes to preservation orders and production orders 
targeting subscriber and access data). The possibility given by the proposed regulation to issue 
production orders targeting subscriber and access for all crimes would potentially expose small 
and medium enterprises in certain member states to the obligation of having to deal directly with 
significantly higher numbers of data requests. For SMEs, executing an order within the 10 days' 
deadline might also be difficult to ensure in cases where there is a lot of data to download and 
process in order to execute the order. Complying with the fast track procedure (6 hours timeframe) 
foreseen in the proposed regulation would be simply impossible for small and medium-sized 
service providers due to lack of in-house expertise and resources. The short time given to execute 
orders would furthermore run the risk of increasing pressures to comply to requests for data, 
without simplifying the technical processes that in practice need to be undertaken in order to 
retrieve the data. Representatives of SMEs potentially affected by the proposed measures also 
expressed concerns about their actual capacity to conduct the complex legal assessment required 
to raise the fundamental rights and conflict of laws objections envisaged in the Commission’s 
proposal.  
Another issue of crucial concern, especially for SMEs, relates to reimbursement of costs. Private 
sector representatives have been vocal in stressing that claiming costs associated with the 
execution of the orders before the authorities of the issuing country would be cumbersome, but 
could also lead to unclear and unforeseeable situations. Especially for small and medium-sized 
companies, it would be practically impossible to effectively navigate the rules and procedure to 
follow in order to obtain costs reimbursement from (potentially) 27 different issuing member 
states. Art 12 of the Council’s general approach on the proposed regulation foresees that member 
states shall inform the Commission about rules for reimbursement, and that the Commission shall 
make them public. However, new procedural and financial hurdles are likely to arise from the 
decision to abandon the model currently governing cost-reimbursement under other mutual 
recognition schemes, where the cost related to the execution of a criminal justice measure are 
claimed before the authorities of the state of execution, where the addressee of the order or its 
legal representative are established. 
Regarding providers of telecommunication services, they usually have well-established 
cooperation channels with the law enforcement authorities in the country where they are based. 
In certain countries, the creation of single Points of Contacts (POCs) on both sides makes it possible 
to maintain trust and smooth cooperation through secure and tested channels. While the service 
provider could appoint these persons as legal representatives for the purpose of receiving and 
executing the order under the proposed e-evidence regulation, recreating the forms of direct 
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cooperation established with domestic investigating and prosecuting authorities along the years is 
expected to be difficult. Under current cross-border judicial cooperation proceedings in the EU, 
the company receives orders that have been received and validated by the national authorities and 
judicial actors responsible for executing the requests for disclosure of data. Incoming requests are 
thus domesticated and consequently 'look’ as if they were national investigative measures. For the 
telecom sector initiatives such as the proposed regulation, which would require to (potentially) 
deal and comply with orders issued by authorities from other 26 member states belonging to 
different constitutional and criminal law traditions. Such an obligation would bring new legal ad 
procedural challenges since it would change tested practices in areas such as verification of 
delivery authenticity, and the use of secure transmission channels for the handling of requests. 
Authentication constitutes a key issue for service providers which might become potential 
recipient of the proposed orders. JUD-IT research has showed the importance of ensuring clear 
rules that would allow for the secure identification of the issuing authorities, as well as provisions 
requiring the latter to send the standardised EPOCs and EPOC-PRs through a common standardised 
gateway.128 
The Council general approach of December 2018 on the e-evidence proposal has envisaged a 
further 'downgrading of safeguards' in comparison to the original Commission's proposal. The 
Council text excludes any meaningful mechanism that service providers could use to raise 
objections against the orders based on their incompatibility with even the most basic forms of 
fundamental rights protection provided in the EU Charter. Several service providers are concerned 
that maintaining a relationship of trust with their customers would become difficult in a context 
where objecting the fundamental rights incompatibility (even if manifest) of the investigative is no 
longer permitted upon receipt of the order. For service providers challenging the orders would 
only become possible in the context of the subsequent enforcement phase, by the mean of 
invoking certain formal ‘restricted grounds’ of non-compliance.129 While it is clear that private 
actors should not become solely responsible for assessing the legality of the investigative measures 
addressed to them, the possibility of addressees of the orders to raise fundamental rights concerns 
is critical, especially because in some cases only service providers will have the ability to identify 
demands that are abusive, overly broad, or inappropriate for other reasons.130 Another point of 
concern relates to the modification of the notification regime to a system where notification to the 
data subject (or to the national data protection authorities) is only possible when exceptionally and 
expressly mandate by the issuing authority.  
 
128Article 8 of the proposed regulation would leave issuing authorities the choice of using 'any mean capable of 
producing a written record' or, whereas available, pre-established channels of communication with the service 
providers. 
129 Recital (45) of the Council General Approach. 
130 Microsoft's Response to the Council Position on the Proposed e-evidence Regulation, January 2019, p. 5 
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The proposal made in the Council’s general approach to add a pecuniary sanction of up to 2% of 
the overall annual turnover in cases of non-compliance undermines any real possibility for 
companies to raise timely objections upon receipt of the orders, even when they should or could 
do so. The general approach indicates that the competent enforcing authority should graduate the 
entity of the sanction upon the assessment of certain factual circumstances such as nature and 
gravity of the ‘breach’ and factors such as voluntariness or negligence at the basis of the addressee 
non-compliance. And yet, a large margin of discretion is left upon enforcing authorities in this 
regard. For instance, the executing authority might still decide to impose a sanction to ‘micro-
enterprises’ that - due to lack of personal resources - fail to comply with the 6 hours deadline of 
an order issued in an emergency case and received outside normal business hours, if the data is 
not transmitted ‘without undue delay’ upon expiration of the deadline.131 
Furthermore, the ratio underlying the sanction proposed by the Council in its general approach 
appears different from the one characterizing the 4% turnover (or €10 million) penalty linked to 
violations of the GDPR’s basic principles for data processing,132 data subjects rights,133 or in case 
of non-compliance with an order by a supervisory authority.134 The sanctions foreseen in the GDPR 
are directed at ensuring the enforcement of EU data protection standards worldwide while 
preventing abuses. By contrast, the sanctions foreseen in the Council general approach on the e-
evidence regulation are directed at sanctioning instances of non-compliance (even when 
legitimate) with investigative measures which, by design, interfere with fundamental rights of data 
subject protection. Upon reception of an Order, companies would be put in the position to execute 
an order even when they should have not done so.  
 
131 Recital (45a) of the Council General Approach. 
132 Art. 5, 6, 7, and 9 of the GDPR. 
133 Art. 12-22 of the GDPR. 
134  Art. 83.6 of the GDPR. 
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 Concluding remarks and policy options 
The JUD-IT project has shown that under EU criminal law, efficiency can only be achieved where 
‘speed’ in gaining access to data is commensurate to respect of the rule of law and fundamental 
rights standards enshrined in the EU primary and secondary norms governing criminal justice 
cooperation and the gathering evidence, including in digital form. 
EU criminal justice and data protection rules and standards apply to investigative measures 
emanating from member states’ authorities, which, acting under the scope of EU law, seek to 
access data across borders (both within and outside the EU). They must also be respected by 
foreign authorities requesting electronic information (pertaining to EU citizens or not) or held by 
private companies operating under EU law. Furthermore, they are binding upon the service 
providers holding the data sought. Fundamental principles of law deriving from national 
constitutional traditions (of EU and third countries) must also be considered to guarantee that data 
are collected lawfully across borders and can be admitted as evidence before the courts. 
Data-gathering tools for criminal justice purposes must function in ways that prevent the multi-
level conflicts of laws that typically derive from extraterritorial enforcement of criminal jurisdiction. 
From an EU perspective, such conflicts can be avoided only through effective judicial oversight over 
the issuing and execution of cross-border criminal justice measures. Preservation of trust in the EU 
criminal justice system is rooted in the principle of separation of powers, and practically ensured 
through day-to-day cooperation between the competent judicial authorities of the different 
countries concerned by a cross-border data-gathering measure. 
Across the EU, the judicial authorities responsible for respectively requesting, validating, and 
executing investigative measures targeting electronic information differ depending on factors such 
as the specific type of data sought, whether the measure involves preservation or production of 
data, but also based on the categories of persons affected, as well as the specific stage of the 
proceedings in which such measures are to be executed. Different national rules apply to the 
conditions justifying access to information for criminal justice purposes, as well as to the specific 
procedural safeguards applying to law enforcement requests for data sought in criminal 
proceedings. 
The systematic involvement of competent judicial authorities in the country of issuing and 
execution of a criminal justice decision is a crucial precondition for mutual understanding and trust. 
On the one hand, it ensures that requests for electronic information are lawful, necessary and 
proportionate. On the other hand, it allows for the appropriate assessment of whether legitimate 
and indeed obligatory grounds exist to refuse the implementation of another country’s data-
gathering measure.  
Only judicial authorities meeting precise independence standards possess the institutional 
prerogatives and professional capacity to appropriately scrutinise the legality, necessity, and 
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proportionality of a criminal justice decision, but also to decide not to recognise or execute of 
another member state’s criminal law enforcement measure. Member states’ judicial authorities 
are in fact those with whom the duty to protect and enforce fundamental rights and freedoms of 
concerned individuals, including both suspects and accused persons, and data subjects’ rights 
arising from EU law primarily lies. While private companies might be well-placed to raise certain 
fundamental rights concerns (e.g. those emerging from highly technical assessments), they should 
not become responsible for ensuring the fundamental rights compliance of law enforcement 
measures directed at the collection of data for criminal justice purposes. 
A clear legal framework is needed by suspects and accused persons to effectively defend their 
rights and exercise their prerogatives at all stages of criminal proceedings. Data subjects must also 
be protected against unlawful interference, and their rights restricted or interfered with by law 
enforcement actors only in accordance with the law, and to the extent that is necessary and 
proportionate in a democratic society.  
In light of the above, a number of policy options emerge as possible ways forward to: improve the 
uses currently made of currently existing instruments of judicial cooperation for evidence 
gathering in criminal matters, and tackle related implementation challenges, and; address 
challenges identified in relation to the e-evidence proposal, and its compatibility with the rules and 
standards governing criminal justice cooperation within the EU, and in relations with third 
countries.  
8.1 Enhancing already existing judicial cooperation instruments  
Within the EU, the EIO offers a valuable tool for member states to cooperate in the field of evidence 
gathering in criminal proceedings. This mutual recognition instrument can increase the level of 
judicial scrutiny and protection of cross-border measures that, in a purely domestic context, could 
be issued and executed without prior judicial validation. While more time is required for the EIO 
to ‘fully flourish’, additional efforts could and should be made to address existing implementation 
gaps and operational and technical shortcomings. 
8.1.1 Practitioner’s guidance and specialised training 
Across the EU, a serious problem that has been identified is that practitioners are often ‘lost in 
translation’ due to the different legal terms and notions used across various countries. The 
compilation of a ‘glossary’ for practitioners, with basic explanatory concepts, comments and links 
to legal provisions related to other countries, could help resolve this issue. If there is some 
streamlined guidance, practitioners would be able to navigate obstacles much more easily. 
More efforts should be devoted to promoting systematic exchange of practical experiences among 
judicial actors and legal practitioners and developing guidelines to follow when issuing or executing 
EIOs requiring preservation or production of data. Specialised trainings should be promoted at the 
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transnational level to improve competent judicial authorities’ mutual understanding of reciprocal 
administrative practices and challenges faced in issuing and/or executing EIOs. These initiatives 
could also help raise practitioners’ awareness of the possible ways in which the EIO can be used to 
access different categories of data sought for criminal justice purposes within the EU. 
Regarding member states’ cooperation with the US, further support should be given to practical 
measures directed at improving cooperation and mutual understanding between member states 
and US judicial and diplomatic authorities, including through the organisation of technical 
dialogues, training, and exchanges of information and promising practices on applicable rules and 
procedures related to the issuing and treatment of MLA requests in a transatlantic context. More 
human and financial resources could be allocated to support judicial authorities in the formulation 
of ‘quality requests’. 
To date, only a very few member states have appointed specialised liaison magistrates in 
Washington, despite the fact that their deployment can facilitate the processing of their countries’ 
MLA requests in US, and in particular ensure that they take US legal standards into due account, 
most notably that of ‘probable cause’. Guidelines on how to issue ‘emergency requests’ for data 
held by US companies could also be developed in cooperation between the EU and the US, and 
made available to practitioners across the Union. 
8.1.2 Secure and swift channels of communication 
The EU should maintain and increase support for the development of tools aimed at facilitating 
judicial cooperation and communication, including through the e-Evidence Digital Exchange 
System, which is based on the e-CODEX platform and designed to provide a channel for digital 
exchanges of EIOs and replies between EU judicial authorities. Further development of these new 
channels for transmitting EIOs could streamline and speed up cooperation and exchange of data 
and evidence between the competent authorities of member states in a trusted and secure way. 
The possibility to also use the e-CODEX platform to automatically translate EIOs issued or received 
could significantly reduce administrative burdens. In the meantime, prosecution offices and courts 
of member states participating in the EIO could be encouraged to award a contract (following a 
public tender) to private translation firms, under the terms of which a minimum number of pages 
per month, and even per day in urgent cases, shall be translated on demand. This practice would 
release judicial authorities from the burden of translation while accelerating the whole process. 
It could be envisaged the establishment of a 24/7 online support service capable of providing 
relevant information on EIOs submission and follow-up procedures, including information on 
expected timelines for execution could also be considered. Taking due account of the different 
rules, procedures, and categories of actors involved in the MLAT process, similar solutions could 
also be explored to improve secure communication and transmission of requests with and from 
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the US. Guidelines could also be developed to help private companies (especially SMEs) to learn 
how to deal with different types of cross-border requests for data.  
8.1.3 Monitoring and ensuring effective judicial oversight 
EU countries should ensure that judicial scrutiny over the issuing and execution of EIOs is not only 
formal, or just amounting to an automatic approval of police requests for data. Issuing authorities 
should not use the EIO to bypass judicial checks by authorities different from the one issuing the 
request or investigating the case, when their involvement is foreseen in equivalent domestic 
procedures. These practices run counter to the rule according to which issuing member states shall 
ensure that legal remedies equivalent to those available in a similar domestic case are applicable 
to the investigative measures indicated in the EIO. 
JUD-IT research has also shown that differences still exist in the ways in which EIO treat incoming 
requests for data, as compared to domestic ones. Some EU countries apply an additional level of 
scrutiny over EIOs received from other member states. Such cases shall be better monitored to 
verify whether they effectively undermine the EIO attempt at moving beyond the MLATs system 
within the participating member states.  
8.1.4 Effective protection of defence rights 
Defendants should be effectively empowered to require the issuing of an EIO, “within the 
framework of applicable rights of the defence in conformity with national criminal procedure”. 
Legislative gaps at the national level should be addressed by those EU countries that did not include 
the corresponding EIO Directive provision in their national legislation. 
In parallel, efforts should be made to tackle the lack of knowledge among defence lawyers about 
the possibility to use this instrument. Increasing legal practitioners’ awareness about the existence 
of the instrument and of the ways and circumstances in which it can be used is especially important 
to effectively guarantee the principle of equality of arms in mutual recognition proceedings. More 
research should be conducted to foster a better understanding of how to deliver effective defence 
rights through improved access to a lawyer and legal aid in the different phases of cross-
jurisdictional investigations that involve use of data. 
8.2 Aligning the e-evidence proposal with the EU rule of law, criminal justice and data 
protection standards 
Several options could be explored to address the open questions that emerge when analysing the 
proposed e-evidence regulation in light of EU primary and secondary law. 
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8.2.1 Direct contact between competent judicial authorities  
Member states authorities could be allowed to issue preservation orders and address them directly 
to service providers across borders, prior validation by an independent administrative body or 
judicial authority and subject to strict ex-ante necessity and proportionality assessment.  
Effective judicial oversight over the issuing and execution of production orders should be always 
ensured, regardless of the type of data sought. The possibility should exist for the executing 
authority to verify that the issuing of the EIO is necessary and/or proportionate, and to consult the 
issuing authority on the importance of executing the preservation order, in line with EIO rules. 
Grounds for non-recognition and non-execution should be foreseen, in line with existing EIO rules.  
8.2.2 Restricting application of the new instruments ratione materia 
Given the fundamental rights-sensitive character of the proposed measures, considerations should 
be given to the possibility to limit the scope of application of the proposed regulation to certain 
types of crimes. 
The use of production or preservation orders could be restricted to the investigation or 
prosecution of offences capable of attracting a maximum custodial sentence of at least 3 years or 
more. A three-year threshold for all orders (and not just for production orders targeting content 
or transactional data) would limit the scope of the instruments to more serious crimes, without 
excessively limiting the possibilities of its use by practitioners. The use of orders could also be 
allowed for the purpose of investigating or prosecuting offences for which evidence is typically 
available only or mostly in electronic form. For this purpose, a list of specific harmonised offences 
could be drafted and annexed to the e-evidence regulation.  
8.2.3 Enhancing rights of suspects and accused persons, and of data subjects 
Restrictions to the rights to be informed should be limited to situations where maintaining secrecy 
is necessary and proportionate to the need of protecting sensitive law enforcement information.  
Exceptions to investigating or prosecuting authorities’ notification duties should not be formulated 
in an excessively broad way which systematically prevents the exercise of criminal justice (fair 
trials) and data protection (fair data processing) rights in practice. The practical exercise of the right 
of data subjects to be informed could be enabled, for instance, through the involvement of trusted 
third parties (e.g. national data protection authorities).  
The proposed regulation could include provisions detailing the conditions upon which the suspects 
could request competent authorities the issuing of the envisaged investigative measures. To 
ensure the 'equality of arms' principle in mutual recognition proceedings, the regulation should 
not only generally envisage the possibility for defence lawyers to request the issuing of production 
and preservation orders, but also determine the conditions and circumstances in presence of 
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which such requests could be made, and the specification of some criteria for their assessment by 
competent authorities in the issuing country.  
The draft regulation could include provisions establishing that when the ex-post review of the way 
in which the data were gathered reveals that certain data were obtained unlawfully, such 
information should not be admissible as evidence. The proposal could also directly indicate the 
types of remedies or reparations available to the data subjects once the latter has proved that 
his/her rights were abusively interfered with in the context of the data-gathering procedures under 
discussion.  
Provisions similar to those included in the EIOs related to ex-ante and ex-post judicial remedies 
should be included, in particular to clarify that remedies ensured in the country of issuing should 
be without prejudice to the ex-ante and ex-post guarantees of fundamental rights in the executing 
state. 
8.2.4 Legal clarity for private companies 
The scrutiny of orders received by a private company should only be intended as providing an 
‘additional safeguard’, which is not a substitute for the responsibility of EU member states to 
protect the fundamental rights of their citizens or of any subject falling under their jurisdiction. 
More precise provisions specifying the exact grounds, conditions and circumstances upon which 
companies might raise objections against a received order could be included in the e-evidence 
regulation. Further clarifications could be provided about the conditions and circumstances in 
presence of which an order should be considered as manifestly abusive in light of the EU Charter. 
The possibility to seek clarifications or raise objections should also be given when fundamental 
rights risks, even if not manifest, are identified with regard to the received orders. More 
information should be included in the certificate accompanying the order to allow the addressee 
of an order to assess whether a legitimate ground of non-compliance subsist.  
Financial sanctions against cases of non-compliance need to be carefully regulated and subject to 
stricter necessity and proportionality criteria. The introduction of financial sanctions in the 
regulation should not undermine any real possibility for the companies to raise legitimate 
objections to the orders.  
The proposed regulation should ensure that providers are not placed in a worse position to 
challenge unlawful or otherwise inappropriate orders than they would be under domestic law. 
Legal avenues available to providers under domestic law to challenge orders should be at least 
equal to those currently indicated in a European Investigation Order. 
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8.2.5 Preventing future conflicts of law in a transatlantic context  
Key standards stemming from the Court rulings and concerning conditions ensuring the legality of 
data transfer to third countries will need to be taken carefully into account In the negotiations of 
a new EU-US Agreement for cross-border access to electronic information in criminal proceedings. 
Transfer of personal data from the EU to the US should be made conditional on verification that 
the US offers an adequate (i.e. equivalent) level of data protection to the one granted under EU 
law, read in light of the Charter. To date, adequacy decisions currently in place with the US do not 
cover data exchanges in the law enforcement and criminal justice sector. The legal basis for the 
exchange data sought for criminal justice measures is currently provided by the EU-US MLA 
agreement, which require the involvement of independent oversight authorities responsible for 
reciprocally verifying that the standards and conditions are met for each data transfers. The 
Umbrella Agreement also applies. 
A new agreement between the US and the EU on the exchange of electronic data in criminal 
proceedings should foresee the involvement of the judicial authorities of both parties as soon as 
possible in the process of gathering electronic data, and ensure that these authorities would have 
the possibility to review the compliance of the orders with fundamental rights and raise grounds 
for refusal. 
Any future EU/US agreement on cross-border data gathering for criminal justice purposes will need 
to ensure reciprocity and avoid discrimination based on nationality. There would be no reciprocity 
in a context where EU authorities still needed to meet probable cause standards in order to obtain 
US citizens’ data held by US companies, while the US would be granted the power to directly 
compel companies falling under EU jurisdiction to disclose and transfer any type of data (i.e. 
content and non-content including, it seems, when such data pertain to EU citizens), without 
obtaining prior authorisation of an EU member state court. 
The new agreement should provide the only channel for issuing and executing requests at the 
transatlantic level. Data-gathering measures by law enforcement authorities should not be served 
outside the legal framework of the agreement. 
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